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Commentators have long recognized that much of the work of commercializing an
invention occurs after a patent issues. They have not recognized, however, that by the
time market conditions make commercialization potentially attractive, the remaining
patent term might be sufficiently short that a patentee will not develop an invention or
will not spend as much on development as if more patent term remained. The concern
about patent underdevelopment provides a counterweight to patent prospect theory,
which urges that patents be issued relatively early. By insisting on a substantial
degree of achievement before patenting, the patent system reduces the risk of patent
underdevelopment. Underdevelopment may still be a problem for some inventions,
however, for example in the field of genomics. A possible solution is a system of
patent extension auctions. A patentee would be allowed to request such an auction,
but could win it only by substantially outbidding third parties. Patentees will call for
auctions only when the benefits of ownership continuity, and thus of continued patent
development, are relatively high.
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INTRODUCTION

When in possession of property for only a limited time, one may exercise less care with
the property than one would if one expected to own it in perpetuity. Someone renting a car, for
example, may not treat the car as well as if the person owned the car. Similarly, in the real
property context, a life tenant has less than optimal incentives to maintain or to improve
property. Real property law addresses this danger with the doctrine of waste, which requires that
“the life tenant exercise[] the ordinary care of a prudent person in preserving and protecting the
property” and “commit[] no acts that would permanently injure the remainder interest.”1 Yet
there is one field of property law in which ownership for a limited time is ubiquitous, but courts
and commentators have paid no attention to the danger that owners will have insufficient
incentives to maintain or develop the property right. This field is patent law. 2
A patent owner receives a patent for only a limited time, currently twenty years from the
date the patent application was filed.3 Although the issuance of the patent reflects a
1

Life Estate: Termination Because of Waste, REAL ESTATE L. REP., Mar. 1997, at 5 (citing McIntyre v. Scarbrough, 471 S.E.2d
199 (Ga. 1996) as providing a useful illustration of the doctrine); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 822-23 (2001) (discussing the evolution of the law of waste in the
landlord-tenant context). I am grateful to John Duffy for first pointing me to the analogy between nondevelopment of patents and
waste of real property.
2
Some commentators have considered whether intellectual property law may tolerate waste, but they have not elaborated the
nature of the waste or noted that the finite patent term makes the danger of waste particularly severe. See Edwin C. Hettinger,
Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 44 (1989) (recognizing that the incentive to charge high prices for
intellectual property might create waste, but not considering the danger of underdevelopment of the patent right); Justin Hughes,
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 328-29 (1988) (noting that patent law, in contrast to copyright law,
may risk waste by not requiring the right owner to commercialize the property, but not indicating why failure to commercialize is
a danger); see also infra note 1 (discussing the concept of waste).
3
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2005).
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determination that the patentee has created a new and nonobvious invention,4 the receipt of the
patent is not the last step in the process of innovation. To realize profits, the patentee must still
commercialize the invention.5 This process might include improvement of manufacturing
technologies or further scientific testing of the invention. Before a full rollout of patented
products, the patentee will often perform limited market tests to ensure that commercialization
will be profitable. Even after placing the product on the market, the patentee might need to
engage in marketing and advertising expenditures to inform the public about the benefits of the
patented product. All of these expenditures have the potential to improve the value of the
property right, and they are thus analogous to expenditures that a life tenant might make to
improve real property. Just as the life tenant may not make improvements to real property that
would be cost-justified considering the interests of both the life tenant and the owner of the
remainder interest, so too might a patentee not undertake some commercialization expenses that
would maximize the joint interests of it and the public.
Perhaps the problem of patent underdevelopment has received no systematic attention
because the problem is less severe in the intellectual property context than in the real property
context. Real property often requires continuous maintenance and can benefit from periodic
improvements, while intellectual property, once developed and commercialized, might not
require additional infusion of resources. Sometimes, for example, the necessary scientific testing
of an invention will be completed by the time a patent term expires, and the cost of maintaining
the knowledge produced by such scientific testing might be negligible. The owner of a patent,
moreover, may sometimes receive an additional intellectual property reward for improving the
property, for example when the patentee’s further advances in the technology justify the award
of an improvement patent that effectively extends patent life.6 To the extent that this is the case,
patent underdevelopment is not a great concern.7

4

Id. § 103(a).
See generally F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 727
(2005) (considering the implications of new institutional economics for commercialization of innovation).
6
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (allowing patents for “new and useful improvement[s]” of inventions); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1000-13 (1997) (providing an overview of patent law’s
approach to improvements).
7
But see Part II.C (suggesting that the finiteness of the patent term might suboptimally reduce patentees’ incentives to make even
patentable improvements to their inventions).
5
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It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that patent underdevelopment is irrelevant to
the design of a patent system. First, if patent underdevelopment is rare, that may be because the
patent system already includes protections that make the problem less significant, and so an
appreciation of the problem may enrich our positive understanding of patent law. Some patent
systems explicitly penalize nondevelopment, for example by allowing for compulsory licensing
when a patentee fails to take active steps to commercialize an invention.8 The United States does
not take this approach, but even the structure of the U.S. patent system indirectly limits patent
underdevelopment. In particular, all patent systems impose nontrivial prerequisites before a
patent can be issued, 9 ordinarily ensuring that an inventor will have made substantial investments
before a patent is issued. This means less money will be needed to complete the innovation
process, making it less likely that a patentee will decide that it is not worth it to spend the
remaining amount necessary to commercialize the patent. This observation suggests that
proposals to grant patents based on only a small degree of inventive efforts may be flawed. It
thus provides a counterweight to Edmund Kitch’s famous prospect theory of patent law.10
Second, even if patent underdevelopment is rare, it might be of great concern in particular
technological fields, and the problem could beset a few inventions in other technological areas. It
might appear that even when the patent system does not directly protect commercialization
activities, it provides a long enough patent term for development to take place.11 But it often will
be in the patentee’s interest to delay commercial implementation until relatively late in the patent
term. Indeed, a central observation of Kitch’s is that there are often long delays between initial
issuance of a patent and commercialization.12 This observation builds on a theory of Yoram
Barzel, explaining that providing a property right in the ability to delay an invention may

8

European law allows compulsory licensing when an invention has been abandoned. See generally Ronald E. Myrick, Influences
Affecting the Licensing of Rights in a Unitary European Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 81, 95 (1993)
(discussing this doctrine). Courts might have difficulty determining what would count as “underdevelopment,” if the law sought
to discourage anything short of outright abandonment. For an argument that patent rights should not be surrendered as a result of
failure to practice the underlying invention, see F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property & Intellectual Property: An
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access 65 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
9
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (setting forth the requirements for patenting inventions in the United States).
10
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). For a brief statement of
the prospect theory and an overview of criticisms, see A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents – The NotQuite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 281-82 (1996).
11
Even Kitch assumes that there generally will be sufficient patent term for commercializing an invention. See Kitch, supra note
10, at 285.
12
See id. at 272 (providing a full-page table listing various inventions and their patent and commercialization dates).
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increase private and social welfare.13 Although Barzel recognized that delay may also have
costs,14 Barzel and Kitch did not recognize the possibility that long delays before
commercialization activities increase the risk of underdevelopment, or even of nondevelopment,
of patents. Especially when patents are granted on mere “prospects” before commercialization
activity is economical, the patent system encourages delay. With only a finite patent term, by the
time patents would be worth exploiting in a hypothetical system of infinite terms, the patentee
might expect to recover too small a portion of development activity to justify a patent.
The problem of patent underdevelopment might at first appear to be at most a temporary
obstacle. For if by the time a patent would be worth exploiting there are only a few years of
patent term remaining, at least the patent will soon fall into the public domain. In fact, however,
the prospect of an invention falling into the public domain may provide a reason that the problem
of patent underdevelopment is more serious in the patent context than in the real property
context. At least a life tenant can negotiate with the owner of the remainder interest, with the
former agreeing to improve or maintain the property given some contribution from the latter.
Such negotiations are not possible for a patent owner facing a patent term that is soon to expire.
It is impossible to reach accommodation with all of the entrepreneurs who might like to
commercialize the patent later,15 let alone with all the end users who might benefit from
development of the patent during the patent term. Because of the danger of free-riding, each
person who might benefit from development of the patent during the patent term by the patentee
will have little incentive to contribute to the patentee’s present development efforts.
Moreover, the eventual placement of the patent in the public domain does not guarantee
that the patent will be developed. Suppose, for example, that scientific testing is needed to
determine whether commercialization of a patented invention is feasible. With the patent in the
public domain, any private party considering whether to perform such scientific testing must
worry about the possibility that third parties will free-ride on the information produced. If such
testing produces only information, but not an invention that itself can be patented, there will be

13

See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968).
Id. at 348, 355 (noting that invention might occur inefficiently late because an inventor cannot capture the full social benefit of
an invention).
15
Each entrepreneur who might hope to sell or improve the patented product after the patent term will have an incentive to freeride on the development activities of the patentee and on any subsidy to the patentee provided by other similarly situated
entrepreneurs.
14

5

PATENT UNDERDEVELOPMENT

little incentive for private actors to invest in it. They will anticipate that if the scientific testing
indicates that the product will be successful, then the third parties will enter the market too.
Precisely the same argument applies to commercial experiments, such as test markets to assess
the public’s demand for the invention or for products that might incorporate it. Although
inventors might keep their precise data from test marketing secret, competitors might be able to
obtain some information about sales and then determine whether to enter markets themselves
after the end of the original patent term. Incentives to engage in any kind of experimentation,
scientific or commercial, decrease near the end of the patent term.
Sometimes, of course, first-mover advantages alone will suffice to spur development of
technologies.16 When the patentee concludes that these are insufficient, even in combination with
whatever portion of the patent term remained, third parties also might not be willing to bear the
expense of commercialization after the patent expires. If the patentee did not believe that
whatever patent term existed was enough to justify the expense of development and
commercialization, other possible developers of the technology seem likely to decide similarly
not to develop and commercialize, unless some third party has some advantage in
commercialization over the patentee and yet was unable to reach an agreement during the patent
term to combine efforts with the patentee. Some inventions that would be commercialized with a
longer patent term might not be developed, or they might be much delayed.
How significant a problem is patent underdevelopment? Because our patent system in
fact is not nearly as much of a prospect system as it might be, probably the problem is worth
worrying about only for a minority of patents, particularly embryonic patents. Whether the
problem will occur for a particular patent turns on a variety of factors. The lower the costs of
developing a patent after issuance, and in particular the lower the development costs that do not
themselves produce new patentable inventions, the smaller will be the danger of patent
underdevelopment. The greater the initial requirements for obtaining a patent, the less likely it
will be that the patentee will decide to abandon the project. The problem, for example, could be

16

See generally William T. Robinson et al., First-Mover Advantages from Pioneering New Markets: A Survey of Empirical
Evidence, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 1 (1994) (providing an overview of the econometric literature attempting to assess the extent of
first-mover advantages). More recent work has emphasized the possibility that first movers may suffer from some systematic
disadvantages. See Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover (Dis)advantages: Retrospective and Link with
the Resource-Based View, 19 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1111 (1998) (providing an overview). For a discussion of the implication of firstmover disadvantages for the patent system, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 708-09 (2001).
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greatly reduced if commercialization were required before a patent could be obtained, but such
requirements would produce considerable costs.17 At the other extreme, patents on gene
sequences and other embryonic inventions may come at such an early stage in the research
process that patent underdevelopment is a great concern. Patent nondevelopment will also be a
greater problem, the greater the degree of uncertainty and volatility in estimates of the value of a
patented product once commercialized. When a particular patent probably would be worthless
but has some chance of turning out to be extremely valuable, depending for example on the
development of other technologies for which the patented invention would be a complement, an
inventor’s incentive is to patent early and then wait before sinking substantial development costs.
Because the underdevelopment problem probably applies only to a subset of patents, any
solution to it must be carefully targeted, lest the cure be worse than the disease. Patent extensions
would help reduce underdevelopment, because a patentee considering investments in the original
patent term would be able to realize benefits of this investment in the extension period. But a
practice of legislatively authorized individual extensions to patent terms does not seem likely to
identify the patents for which the social benefits of such extensions would exceed the costs. Even
granting an administrative authority the power selectively to increase patent terms would
promote considerable rent-seeking, as each patentee would seek to claim that the patentee would
engage in far more investment with a patent extension than without. Indeed, patentees might
have a perverse incentive to limit investment early in the patent term, in the hope of persuading
the agency that much commercialization work remained to be done. An adequate solution to the
problem of patent nondevelopment would need to limit the possibility that patentees could
receive windfalls from patent extensions, and therefore that patentees would have incentives to
lobby heavily for them
.
Auctions provide a means of limiting the windfalls that private parties can obtain from
governmentally granted property rights, and careful design of the auction structure and set of
rules for triggering auctions could limit patent extensions to only those cases in which patent
underdevelopment is a strong concern. This Article tentatively proposes a possible design for
patent extension auctions, which might be limited to particular fields of technology in which
underdevelopment seems likely. In this system, a patentee would be allowed before the end of a
17

See infra Part I.B.2 (illustrating the benefit of granting patents at a relatively early stage).
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patent term to request an auction for a patent extension. The catch is that to keep the patent, the
patentee would have to top the bid of the highest third-party bidder by a substantial markup. A
patentee who calls for an auction and then loses would be required to pay some penalty. The
patentee will thus have an incentive to call for an auction only where the benefits of ownership
continuity are relatively large.18 Although this Article cannot determine what the markup should
be, it will offer a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggesting a markup of about 25%.
Presumably, initial experiments with patent extension auctions would involve much higher
markups, so that the first patent extensions granted would be for those patents for which the
problem of underdevelopment is especially severe.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I will show how combining two recent theoretical
perspectives on patent law focusing on opposite ends of the innovation process—one on the time
at which patent races begin and one on the period after patents are issued—points to the problem
of patent underdevelopment. The Part then offers a simulation model demonstrating the danger
of patent underdevelopment, and showing how the patent system’s insistence that patentees
demonstrate a considerable degree of achievement before patents are issued may help to combat
it. Part II offers a tentative empirical assessment of the degree to which the patent
underdevelopment problem remains despite the high threshold for patentability. Although it
would be difficult to design an empirical test that would measure underdevelopment, it is
possible to identify the types of patents for which the problem is likely to be the greatest concern
and the types of development activities that patentees may forego, particularly late in the patent
term. Finally, Part III introduces the proposal for patent extension auctions, considering both the
possibility that the government would decide whether to call for a patent extension auction and
the proposal sketched above in which the patentee has the discretion to demand an auction of the
patent extension.

18

Additional rules ensure that a patentee who values the patent far more than third parties, but not because of the benefits of
ownership continuity, will not call for an auction. In particular, a third-party winner at the auction would be allowed to sell the
patent back to the patentee, but only at the end of the original patent term. See infra text accompanying note 148. As a result, a
third party that recognized the special value of the patent extension to the patentee would bid the full value of the patent
extension to the patentee (placing aside bargaining costs), and anticipating this, the patentee would not be able to pay the markup.
A third party will not factor the benefit of continuity of ownership in a bid, however, because the rule preventing sale during the
patent term will prevent the third party and the patentee from reaching an agreement guaranteeing this.
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I.

A THEORETICAL MODEL

The danger of patent underdevelopment manifests itself when a patentee decides not to
invest in development expenses that the patentee would have undertaken had a longer patent
term been available. To simplify the analysis, this Part will focus on the most extreme form of
patent underdevelopment: patent nondevelopment. This occurs when a patentee decides to
abandon a patent that the patentee would have commercialized if longer patent protection were
available. To assess the theoretical danger of patent nondevelopment, however, we must take a
longer view of the patent process and determine how such a situation might arise. There are at
least two central questions: First, why would a patentee not have undertaken the relevant
development expenses earlier in the patent term? Second, looking back in time still further, why
would a patentee create the invention and apply for the patent so long before development is
feasible?
Each of two recent theoretical works can provide answers to one of these questions, but a
complete understanding of the problem of patent underdevelopment requires that insights from
these works be combined. The first question finds a straightforward answer in Shaun Martin and
Frank Partnoy’s Patents as Options.19 Martin and Partnoy recognize that a patent provides its
holder a series of options, including a litigation option (should a third party arguably be
infringing the patent) and a development option to commercialize the invention.20 An
uncommercialized patent is simply a patent whose development option has not been exercised.
An article by John Duffy, meanwhile, analogizes the patent process to an auction, in which one
of the inventors who agrees to spend money on inventing earliest wins the right to the patent.21
Inventors sometimes might need to engage in inventive activity and seek patents well before
commercialization is possible, lest they lose the patent race. Combining these insights,
competition among inventors forces patenting at an early stage, often so early that patentees will
be quite unsure whether it will be worthwhile to ever exercise the development option that the
patent provides.

19

See Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Patents and Options (unpublished manuscript, 2005). Martin and Partnoy have yet to
release the paper, and the summary here thus reflects a presentation of the anticipated paper made by Martin and Partnoy at
Washington University on November 4, 2005.
20
See id.
21
John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004).
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This analysis can contribute to an answer to a longstanding puzzle about the patent
system: why so many patents appear to be worthless.22 A partial answer to the puzzle is likely
that patent acquisition serves a signaling function,23 but that might not be the entire story.24
Perhaps an additional answer to the puzzle is that many patentees obtain patents for their option
value and then frequently fail to develop the patents.25 This possibility is disturbing in part
because the patent process itself is expensive,26 but also because of the possibilities of
nondevelopment or underdevelopment of an invention. The literature has assumed that
uncommercialized patents are not worth commercializing, and under that view, the private loss
associated with worthless patents is of relatively little social significance. We can safely only
assume, however, that uncommercialized patents are not worth commercializing given the
limited patent grant. If patent rights are abandoned when term extensions would lead to
commercialization and thus to both private and social benefits, then the patent system may be
failing to optimize social welfare relative to a hypothetical system that makes it more difficult to
obtain patents when the possibility of commercialization is uncertain.
Part II.A elaborates on these articles, and Part II.B reports the result of a simulation that
incorporates an insight inherent in the Martin and Partnoy article into a numerical example that
Duffy uses to illustrate his model. Although neither Martin and Partnoy nor Duffy recognize that
our system of finite patent terms produces the danger of patent nondevelopment, an appreciation
of the central insights of both articles makes the problem more worrisome than the analysis of
either taken alone would suggest. Duffy’s analysis ignores patent nondevelopment because he
22

Mark Lemley estimates that only about five percent of patents are ever licensed. Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1507 (2001).
23
See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002) (arguing that because the number of patents a firm obtains
correlates with less measurable attributes of a firm of interest to potential investors, firms may choose to acquire even patents
with little economic value).
24
For a critique of the signals hypothesis, see Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
21-22 (2005).
25
Commentators before Martin and Partnoy noted that a patent is similar to a stock option in that it may or may not be exercised.
See F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games and the Complex Mathematics of Patent
Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1194-95 (2004). Commentators have also analogized patents to lottery tickets. See, e.g.,
Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using Statistical Survival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30
AIPLA Q.J. 317, 328 n.30 (2002); F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 4-7, 15 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (observing
that returns to patents may fit a Pareto distribution, which has a longer and thicker tail than a log normal distribution, and thus
that owning large patent portfolios may not entirely provide for diversification of risk). They have not, however, noted that the
option characteristics of patents may lead to their acquisition at such an early time as to inhibit development within the patent
term.
26
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1498-99 (2001) (estimating the cost of a patent prosecution to be between $10,000 and $30,000 per
patent).
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assumes that the costs and benefits of patenting are known in advance; Martin and Partnoy,
meanwhile, because they ignore that competition among patent racers may lead to acquisition of
patents long before commercialization becomes feasible. A dynamic model incorporating
uncertainty shows how patent nondevelopment can become a danger, and how the patent system
can limit the danger.
A. Options and Auctions
1. Patents as Options
The central observation underlying the Martin and Partnoy analysis is that the future is
always uncertain. Someone who owns a patent cannot be sure how profitable commercialization
of the patent will be, or even how much it will cost to complete the commercialization process.
The future, however, becomes clearer as we move toward it. So, it sometimes makes sense to
wait before irreversibly investing substantial resources. A central observation of “real options
theory”27 is that part of the value of an option that may be exercised over some period of time is
the right to wait for more information about whether the option will be worth exercising. Indeed,
in most contexts, there is no reason to purchase an option rather than the underlying asset if it is
apparent at the time of the purchase that it will definitely make sense at a particular time to
exercise the option. Because a patent functions as an option (or as a series of options), part of its
value lies in the right of the patent owner to wait for the optimal moment to make a decision
about whether to exercise the options that the patent provides. Though privately optimal, this
waiting increases the risk of patent nondevelopment.
Even though information becomes clearer with the passage of time, a patentee will not
always wait forever. By waiting an additional year before making a decision to initiate the
development process, a patentee loses a year of potential profits. Suppose, for example, that it
will cost $1,000,000 to commercialize a patent with twenty years remaining, and that the
patentee believes that there is a fifty percent chance of a good result—a product worth
$2,000,000 in present discounted value—and a fifty percent chance of a bad result—a product
worth nothing. For simplicity sake, assume risk neutrality and that each year of the patent term
would contribute equally to the present discounted value of the commercialized patent, because
27

See generally REAL OPTIONS AND INVEWSTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: CLASSICAL READINGS AND RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS
(Eduardo S. Schwartz & Lenos Trigeorgis, 2004) (containing many important contributions to the field).
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revenues will increase in value at the same rate as the discount rate. The decision whether to
commercialize appears to be a close one, and if waiting were impossible, the patent would
effectively be worth nothing. Waiting a year means that, absent new information, the good result
scenario will provide value of only $1,900,000, because of the lost year of sales. If the patentee
expects, however, that new information will allow for a determination of whether the good result
is, say, 60% likely or only 40% likely, it will easily be worth waiting. If such new information is
equally likely to be favorable or unfavorable, waiting makes the patent worth an expected value
of 0.5 * 0.6 * ($1,900,000 - $1,000,000) = $270,000. The right to delay by one period increases
the value of the patent from $0 to $270,000.
It will rarely be obvious when a patent is issued exactly how long the patentee should
wait before making a decision about commercialization. At each time period, the patentee will
recognize that it may be worth waiting until the next time period. In the interim, the patentee
might undertake some limited development or experimentation on the patent to improve the
patentee’s ability to determine whether additional tentative steps or full-fledged development
efforts are financially justified. It might appear that the finiteness of the patent term would
reduce the patentee’s incentive to wait relative to a hypothetical world of infinite patent terms. In
our own lives, after all, deadlines make us move more quickly. The analogy, however, does not
strictly apply. The economic decision to wait an additional time period depends on whatever new
information might develop and the value of sales attributable to delay, so a rational patentee will
not hurry as a result of the finite patent term. Finiteness limits delay only to the extent that
confining the patentto a particular term may limit uncertainty.
The finiteness of the patent term, however, does have a significant effect on the
patentee’s incentives: It makes it much more likely that the patentee eventually will abandon the
patent altogether. As Martin and Partnoy recognize,28 and as the numerical example above
reinforces, the right to abandon a patent and save the money that otherwise would fund
development of that patent increases the value of the patent right. Although Martin and Partnoy
worry that the litigation option sometimes will be more attractive to patentees than the
development option,29 they do not make the broader point that even in the absence of a right to

28
29

Martin & Partnoy, supra note 19.
Id.
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litigate without developing a patent, the amount of development activity might be inadequate
from a social welfare perspective. The solutions that Martin and Partnoy identify focus on
reducing the value of litigation options, by increasing the exercise price of those options.30 For
example, a fee-shifting regime for patent litigation might discourage patentees from filing
frivolous litigation.31 These solutions might be worthwhile to consider, because the availability
of attractive options besides the development option reduces the probability that the development
option will be exercised, but there may be other approaches to addressing patent
nondevelopment.
An alternative approach that might appear to be sensible would be to increase the length
of the patent term. Patent nondevelopment, after all, is a result of the finite nature of the patent
term. With infinite patent terms and no costs of maintaining a patent, a patent might well prove
valuable in the future. Indeed, because economies grow over time, with infinite patent terms,
patents should become more valuable over time as well, except to the extent that substitutes for
the patented technologies are developed in the interim. The danger of nondevelopment might
appear therefore to produce an argument for systematically longer patent terms than would
otherwise be optimal. To assess additional effects of longer patent terms, we must turn to John
Duffy’s model of the patent system as an auction, a model that counterintuitively counsels in
favor of increasing the length of the patent term even in the absence of a direct concern about
patent nondevelopment. Ironically, we will see that the concern about patent nondevelopment
ultimately complicates Duffy’scase.
2. Patents as Auctions
While Martin and Partnoy consider the incentives of inventors who have already received
patents, Duffy focuses on the incentives of inventors who race against one another in the hope of
receiving them. Earlier commentators had noted the similarity of races and auctions in contexts
including patent law, 32 but they had ignored an aspect of this analogy of crucial import to patent
policy. A race, the earlier scholars realized, amounts to an “all-pay” auction in which each
participant pays the amount of its bid, and participants with higher bids have greater chances of
30

Id.
Id.
32
See, e.g., Wolfgang Leininger, Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations, 33 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 231, 233 (1989).
31
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winning.33 This analysis, however, tended to assume that patent races are like races at track
meets, with all racers starting only after the gun goes off. Duffy’s insight is that inventors can
improve their “bids” and thus their chances of winning the race by committing resources to the
race at an earlier time. The patent race is thus more like a treasure hunt in which each contestant
may start at any time, and those who drag themselves out of bed earlier have an advantage over
the others. Such a hunt would end earlier than one in which the starting time was fixed, and so
too in a patent race will the race end earlier because participants are welcome to begin racing
whenever they please.
Because the patent term is finite, inventors are racing not only to obtain a patent at the
earliest possible time, but also in effect to place the invention into the public domain at the
earliest possible time. The patent race provides a benefit to society, and Duffy analogizes it to a
Demsetzian auction. In 1968, Harold Demsetz argued that instead of directly regulating the
prices charged and quality of services provided by monopolists, the government might hold an
auction for the right to be a monopolist, with the franchise awarded to the bidder who commits to
the best price-quality package.34 Similarly, a patent is awarded to one of the inventors who begin
the race first,35 thus agreeing to commit the invention to the public at the earliest possible time. If
the auction is competitive, the Demsetzian approach to monopoly regulation pushes the returns
of participants down to the level of zero economic profit. So too can the implicit patent auction
lead inventors to start racing at the point in time at which they will earn no economic profit from
doing so.36
The model of patents as Demsetzian auctions makes the patent nondevelopment problem
more severe. To the extent that patent races push patenting to a very early stage, the risk that it
will not be worth exercising the patent development option increases. In his original article,37
33

Id.; see also Michael R. Baye et al., Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
289 (1993) (providing an additional application for the all-pay auction model).
34
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 63 (1968).
35
Duffy recognizes that research is probabilistic, and in an extension to his model he assumes that inventors will only have some
probability in each period of successfully meeting the requirements for patentability. See Duffy, supra note 21,at 480 -83.
36
Id. at 481 (assuming that “firms’ expected profits are zero”).
37
In a subsequent article (written after Duffy read a draft of this one), Duffy recognizes the nondevelopment problem. See John
Duffy, Embryonic Patents: Prospects, Prophesies and Pedis Possessio (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Duffy notes that patent law tries to avoid the problem through the “abandoned experiment” doctrine, which allows abandoned
experiments to be excluded from the prior art, and thus later patents on a technology to be obtained. Id. at 33-35. The doctrine,
however, does not apply to a technology that is patented prior to abandonment, and so it does not address the patent
nondevelopment problem. Duffy also suggests that patent law might allow a third party to repatent the commercialized
realization of an abandoned patented invention. Id. at 36-38. As Duffy recognizes, however, “[c]urrent U.S. patent law has no
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however, Duffy does not recognize the danger of patent nondevelopment, because he assumes
that the costs and benefits of patenting are certain.38 In the absence of uncertainty, an inventor
would never patent an invention and then not commercialize the invention, because the patent
process itself is costly. Uncertainty, however, makes it apparent that patents are options, and so
as long as there is some chance that the option will be worth exercising, an inventor may have an
incentive to seek a patent. An inventor will sometimes be willing to enter a patent race very early
because of the possibility that an invention might turn out to be more valuable than expected.
Thus, an inventor might obtain a patent fully expecting that the patent term will not be long
enough to allow development of the patent, but betting on a small chance that the patent might be
worth pursuing within the patent term.
Adding uncertainty to Duffy’s model or early patenting to the Martin and Partnoy
framework not only makes the patent nondevelopment problem more severe than it would
otherwise seem, but also makes an appropriate solution more elusive. We have already seen that
Martin and Partnoy’s analysis might seem to provide support for a proposal to lengthen patent
terms, and interestingly Duffy, in a separate article, also provides a basis for longer patent
terms.39 Lengthening the patent term might appear sure to delay the introduction of inventions
into the public domain. But lengthening the patent term makes the acquisition of patents more
attractive, and so leads to invention at an earlier time. Under certain assumptions in Duffy’s
mathematical model, this increased incentive effect dominates the delay effect, at least if the
lengthening of the patent term is announced at an early enough point to allow patent racers to
respond by entering the patent races earlier.40 Lengthening the patent term thus leads to
inventions being committed to the public domain at an earlier time. Duffy’s analysis reverses the
ordinary intuition: Longer (but nonretroactive41) patent terms will not benefit inventors as a class,
because more will compete to drive down profits, but they will benefit the public by leading to
inventions that fall into the public domain sooner.
clear doctrine permitting” such repatenting. Id. at 36.
38
Duffy, supra note 21, at 465 -66 (making assumptions about the benefits and costs of patenting without allowing for the
possibility of uncertainty).
39
See John F. Duffy, A Minimum Optimal Patent Term (unpublished manuscript, 2004), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=354282 (visited Aug. 21, 2005) (offering a model suggesting that an optimal patent term is about
as long as the existing patent term or longer).
40
Id. at 4-5.
41
Duffy has argued against providing windfall retroactive term extensions for intellectual property rights. See infra note 133 and
accompanying text.
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Longer patent terms also might appear to have the benefit of reducing patent
nondevelopment, but this is uncertain. If longer patent terms in fact result in patents being placed
in the public domain even earlier, then it may never become worthwhile to exercise a
development option that otherwise would have been worth exercising. There are, again, two
competing effects. On one hand, the longer patent term will mean that if commercialization does
occur relatively early, there will be more time periods in which the inventor can reap the benefits
of commercialization, and the incentive to exercise the development option at some point before
patent expiration will be greater. On the other hand, earlier invention might not mean earlier
commercialization, and the effective patent term might be shorter. If we assume that increasing
the length of the patent term has no effect other than on the particular invention at issue,42 then if
it would not have made sense to commercialize a patent until a particular year, then it still will
not make sense to commercialize the patent until that year in a regime of longer patent terms. But
after that year, there will be fewer years remaining in the patent term, if the longer patent term
indeed has had the effect of making the date at which the invention is committed to the public
domain earlier, and so there will be less of an incentive to exercise the development option. This
story suggests that there in fact is a tradeoff in a longer patent term, though not the same tradeoff
between static and dynamic efficiency that scholars have long imagined.43 Rather, a longer patent
term can lead to some inventions placed in the public domain earlier, but to a greater number of
inventions abandoned. There might well be other more complicated stories,44 but the welfare
effects of systematic patent term extensions at least appear quite complicated.

42

This assumption might be unjustified. For example, it might be that it does not make sense to commercialize a particular
invention until another invention that is a complement to it is developed. But increasing the length of the patent term could also
lead to earlier development of that invention.
43
See generally WILLIAM D. HORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE 76 (1969) (providing the leading account of the
competing effects of a longer patent term).
44
If inventors anticipate that they will not be able to commercialize their inventions until a particular date, we might end up with
precisely the opposite result: a reduced risk of nondevelopment, but a delayed introduction of the invention into the public
domain. Suppose that it will not be feasible for a particular invention, not yet created, to be commercialized until the year 2025,
and suppose that under the existing patent system, invention and patenting would occur in 2015, and the patent therefore would
expire in 2035. If the patent term is lengthened by five years, but commercialization still cannot take place until the year 2025,
invention will take place no earlier than 2010, with patent expiration still occurring in 2035. Because the invention will likely be
more expensive to create in 2010 than in 2015, at least in present discounted value terms, the invention is in fact likely to take
place sometime after 2010, say 2011. As a result, patent expiration will occur in 2036.
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B. A Re-Rethinking of Prospect Theory
Even if the problem of patent nondevelopment does not justify a longer patent term,
patent term extensions might still be useful on a case-by- case basis, if extensions could be
granted for the particular patents for which nondevelopment appears to be a danger. We will
consider whether this is feasible later.45 The combination of the Martin and Partnoy approach and
the Duffy approach, however, does point to a different possible solution: increasing the
minimum threshold for patentability, thus decreasing the proportion of total expenditures on
commercialization and invention that must still be made after a patent issues. Though concerned
that the patent litigation option might be too attractive in comparison to the patent development
option, Martin and Partnoy do not consider this approach, perhaps because they implicitly
assume that the dates of invention and patenting are fixed. In Rethinking the Prospect Theory of
Patents, Duffy, on the other hand, does consider the issue directly, but ends up offering the
precise opposite recommendation: that patents should be granted at a very early stage, when they
are mere patent prospects.46
Duffy’s recommendation, however, might not be correct once patent nondevelopment is
considered, because the prospect approach increases the risk of nondevelopment. A theoretical
appreciation of patent nondevelopment is therefore important not solely because reforms to limit
it could improve the efficiency of the patent system, but also because reforms that otherwise
might be justified could aggravate the problem of patent nondevelopment. Whether
surreptitiously or not, the patent system already to some extent takes the concern of
nondevelopment into account by requiring substantial achievement before patents can be issued.
Consideration of patent nondevelopment thus helps provide a richer positive explanation of the
patent system’s standard of patentability.
To understand how concerns about patent nondevelopment might counsel against the
prospect theory, we must first understand how Duffy’s recognition that the time of invention is
endogenous to the patent system supports the prospect approach. If the hurdle for patentability is
low, the length of the patent race will be shorter. This means that for each participant in the race,
the amount of money the participant stands to lose assuming someone else receives the patent

45
46

See infra Part III.
Duffy, supra note 21, at 471 (offering an illustration of the thesis).
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will be less. Inventors anticipate that the length of the patent race will be shorter, and thus that
the amount of money that those who lose the patent race will have wasted will be smaller. The
expected cost of racing is thus lower, and inventors will begin racing earlier than they otherwise
would. This analysis provides an important new defense of the patent prospect approach. Even if,
as some commentators have suggested,47 inventive activity will develop more rapidly if inventors
are racing against one another, it might still be useful for patent law to declare winners to races
quickly, because the promise of a quick end to the race will make the race start earlier. While the
original basis of Kitch’s prospect theory was that provision of early and broad patents provided
useful ex post incentives, for example by allowing inventors better to coordinate inventive
activity,48 Duffy’s argument suggests that the prospect approach offers benefits before the patent
initially is issued. The debate on prospect theory is central to an assessment of how high the
hurdle for patentability ought to be, and Duffy’s contribution helps to demonstrate that concerns
about wasteful duplication of effort should matter even to those who adhere to the traditional
reward approach to patent law. Wasteful duplication matters not only because it suggests that
resources are being diverted from other activities, but because the prospect of such duplication
will discourage research in the first place.
Nonetheless, the concern about patent nondevelopment provides a countervailing concern
that should at least make policymakers pause before advocating very low hurdles for
patentability. The lower the threshold for obtaining a patent, the cheaper the patent option will be
to purchase initially, and the greater the danger that the option will never be exercised. To the
extent that the patent system acts as an auction for a reduced patent term, it might advance social
welfare by accelerating the entry of an invention into the public domain, but it might reduce
social welfare by increasing the risk that an inventor will not develop or will not commercialize
an invention. Duffy’s analysis ultimately highlights why nondevelopment of patents might be an

47

See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908
(1990) (“Public policy . . . ought to encourage inventive rivalry, and not hinder it. [A] rivalrous structure surely has its
inefficiencies. But such a structure . . . seems a much better social bet than a regime where any one or a few organizations control
the development of any given technology.”); see also Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L . REV. 129, 141 (2004) (concluding that the empirical literature supports the proposition that research will
progress faster when no initial inventor is able to control research); Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision
Architectures, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that decentralized decisionmaking, as occurs in the absence of patent
protection, might produce more breakthrough inventions).
48
Kitch, supra note 10,at 276.
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even more serious problem than waste in the real property context.49 If the patent process
functions as a declining term auction, then effective patent terms might be quite short. Inventors
will not seek patents if they know for certain that by the time they complete development, there
will not be sufficient term remaining to allow them to recoup their costs. But the expected net
benefits of development might change after a patent is issued, and a project that initially
appeared likely to be profitable might become unprofitable. Moreover, the possibility that the
expected net benefits will rise might lead inventors to obtain patents very early for their option
value, even when they expect that it likely will never be profitable to develop them.
To make these points more formally, I will begin with a numerical example that Duffy
uses to explain his case,50 and I will then show how adding uncertainty into the model might alter
Duffy’s conclusions. In the numerical example, a single firm will obtain a patent in the first year
at which obtaining the patent would produce positive rents, recognizing that if it did not incur the
costs necessary to obtain the patent in that year, another firm would. The invention produces
social benefits that grow at an annual rate of 5%, reaching $10 per year in 2010 and higher levels
beyond. The cost of the invention is $100 in the year in which the invention occurs, but a
prospect patent costs only $1 in the year it is obtained, with the invention then costing $99 to
complete in the year of invention. Finally, the annual rate of return on capital (i.e., the discount
rate) is 10 percent.
With these assumptions, we can calculate for different regimes the present discounted
value of the net social benefits of the prospect system and of a stylized nonprospect system, in
which no patent is granted until an invention is fully developed. We can also calculate for each
system, the year at which patenting and commercialization will occur (which will by definition
be the same for the nonprospect system). The ultimate goal of this analysis is to show how the
problem of patent nondevelopment might strengthen the case for a nonprospect system. To do
this, we will integrate a point suggested by Martin and Partnoy, that the costs and benefits of
patenting may be uncertain, directly into the Duffy model. To provide for a more complete
analysis of the threshold for patentability, however, we will first relax some other assumptions in
49

See supra note 1 (discussing how real property deals with the problem of waste).
See id. at 465-66. Duffy does not explicitly calculate the social benefit of a prospect system compared to a nonprospect system.
While he notes that the prospect system produces a social gain from the innovation entering the public domain sooner, see id. at
469, he does not note that this gain is partly offset by the innovation’s being introduced later in a prospect system than in a
nonprospect system.
50
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Duffy’s model: first, that the public obtains no value from a patent during the patent term besides
what is captured by the patentee; and second, that a patent race always produces a unique winner.
1. Appropriability of Social Surplus
In the simplest version of his model, Duffy illustrates that a patent prospect system can
produce patenting, and thus entry into the public domain, two years earlier than a nonprospect
system.51 This simple example illustrates a previously unrecognized consequence of Barzel’s
point that the right to delay inventive efforts provides benefits to the patentee. Because the
returns to the patentee count in social welfare, the patentee’s right to delay can increase social
welfare. It might seem at first glance, however, that the public would suffer from delayed
introduction of the invention to the public. Barzel placed aside this effect by assuming that an
inventor could appropriate the full social surplus of an invention, thus placing aside the interest
of the public altogether. He recognized, however, that relaxing this assumption might mean that
invention would occur too late, rather than too early.52 Duffy’s analysis is important because it
shows that the right to delay can benefit not only the inventor, but also the public, which receives
the invention earlier.
By considering the effects of patent expiration, Duffy’s model thus relaxes the
assumption in Barzel’s model that the patentee captures all the social surplus of the invention.
Duffy, however, continues to assume “that the patentee captures all of the social benefits during
the patent term.”53 This assumption is unrealistic, because a patentee is unlikely to be able to
engage in perfect price discrimination, and because a patentee will not be able to prevent all
uncompensated uses of the information in the patent. Once we relax this assumption, we can
show that even if the prospect system results in inventions being placed in the public domain
earlier than a nonprospect system (i.e., one in which one must complete development of the
invention before obtaining a patent), it might reduce social welfare by inefficiently delaying the
introduction of the invention.

51

Duffy, supra note 21, at 469.
Barzel, supra note 13,at 355 tbl.2.
53
Id. at 466.
52
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Figure 1 illustrates the effect of allowing the portion of rents that are appropriable to
vary.54 The x-axis reports the proportion of the social benefits of the patent that the patentee,
rather than the public, is able to appropriate. The left y-axis reports the present discounted value
of the total social benefits of the patent, including those captured by the patentee and those
captured by the public. The curves beginning at the lower-left of the graph show this value for
both a prospect system and a nonprospect system for each possible appropriability proportion.
The right y-axis, meanwhile, represents years, and the curves beginning at the upper-left show
the year that patenting will take place in the prospect and nonprospect systems, and the year that
invention will be completed in the prospect system, which is the system that allows the patentee
to delay completion of the invention until after the patent.
Figure 1.
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As Duffy’s analysis suggests, the patent system leads to slightly earlier patenting and yet
later invention in a prospect system than in a nonprospect system, and this holds regardless of the
proportion of the social benefit that the inventor can capture. A prospect system produces greater
total discounted social benefits than a nonprospect system when the inventor can appropriate all
the social benefits of the patent during the patent term, but the difference is very small. Atlower
levels of appropriability, moreover, a nonprospect system produces somewhat greater social
54

The numbers used to derive the numbers in this and subsequent charts were obtained from a computer program developed in
C++. The program is available from the author. The program calculates benefits and costs from the year 2000 to the year 2250
and discounts those benefits and costs to the year 2000. Because the discount rate is higher than the rate of growth, the effect of
years past 2250 on the present discounted value of social welfare in the year 2000 is trivial.
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benefits than a prospect system. The delay between the acquisition of the prospect patent and the
date of invention is socially excessive, because the patentee does not fully internalize the social
benefits of earlier development of the invention. A prospect system might thus cause excessive
delay in a world in which the spillovers from patents are relatively high.55
2. Multiple Participants in the Race
This numerical example, of course, should not lead to a conclusion that nonprospect
systems dominate prospect systems in the real world. Slight changes in assumptions could
reverse that conclusion.56 Most significantly, Duffy argues that a significant virtue of a prospect
system is that it reduces duplicative efforts to develop an invention.57 But in Figure 1, there is no
duplication of efforts. The first inventor willing to bear the costs of the invention immediately
spends the needed sums and wins the race.
Figure 2 modifies this by assuming that two firms are competing for the patent and
continuing to invest equal resources in obtaining the patent until, at the moment of patenting, the
patent is issued to one firm or the other. In this figure, the benefit of limiting duplication is
sufficient to ensure that a prospect system comfortably dominates a nonprospect system for the
full range of appropriability values. A principal reason for this is that invention occurs much
earlier with the prospect approach, because the promise of reduction in duplicative effort leads
the firms to start racing earlier. Of course, this figure should not lead one to conclude that a
nonprospect system necessarily dominates the prospect system either. With changes in some of
Duffy’s other assumptions, the nonprospect system once again can catch up to the prospect
system. In particular, consider the possibility that the award of a patent may not end a patent
race.

55

For studies suggesting that there are considerable spillovers from patents and other research and development, see Timothy F.
Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance: Mainframe Computers in Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
742, 753 (1986); and Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations, 91 Q.J. ECON. 221,
234 (1977).
56
For example, it would be more realistic to assume that once the invention enters the public domain, social benefits increase
somewhat, because there is no longer deadweight loss. This seems likely to have only a slight effect in Figure 1, however,
because the dates of patenting in the prospect and nonprospect system appear quite close.
57
See Duffy, supra note 21, at 469 -75; see also id. at 443-44 (noting that this is not necessarily counterbalanced by increased
competition to obtain the patent prospect, because rents also can be dissipated by earlier patenting).
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Figure 2.
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Under Kitch’s view of prospect theory, patents should be granted early and broadly.
Duffy argued that patents need not be broad,58 but his model implicitly assumed that patents
would be sufficiently broad to ensure that there is only one winner to the patent race. Yet we
know that patents using distinct technologies might target the same consumer market. For
example, although Prozac was the first selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor, a number of other
SSRI’s since the introduction of Prozac have earned patents and market share.59 Each drug might
have somewhat different characteristics that might make each optimal for different types of
patients.60 To the extent that “inventing around” produces patents with overlapping functionality,
however, the same inefficiency that might characterize patent races can exist. In effect, where
different inventors are pursuing different technological means to the same or a similar outcome,
a patent race can have multiple winners.
As Figure 3 shows, the existence of multiple winners to a patent race largely eviscerates
the benefits of a prospect system relative to a nonprospect system. As in Figure 2, two firms are
racing against one another for patents, but in Figure 3, both firms obtain patents. Unsurprisingly,

58

Duffy, supra note 21, at 499-500.
See Which SSRI?, 45 MEDICAL LETTER 93 (2003) (providing an overview of different SSRIs).William Landes and Richard
Posner use SSRIs to illustrate the point that a patent race may have multiple winners. See WILLIAM N. LANDES & RICHARD A.
CTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 301-02 (2003).
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRU
60
Which SSRI?, supra note 59, at 93 (“Some patients who fail to respond to one SSRI may respond to another, possibly because
of differences in tolerability.”) (citation omitted).
59
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the dramatic benefits of the prospect system in reducing duplication disappear. In Figure 3, even
though the patentees are working on different technological means to the same end, they are
nonetheless effectively duplicating one another’s efforts after the patents are received. The
prospect system thus differs from the nonprospect system only in that the prospect system
continues to allow inventors to delay innovation, as in Figure 1. Thus, once again, there is a
slight advantage for the prospect system with complete appropriability of social surplus and a
slight advantage for the nonprospect system with incomplete appropriability. The early granting
of patents will improve welfare only to the extent that early patents succeed in discouraging
other players from engaging in further inventive activity.
Figure 3.
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Figure 3 does not take into account that a patent system that results in multiple patents
targeting the same consumer demand might produce other benefits, such as a greater range of
products from which consumers can choose and reduced prices.61 These considerations, however,
generally militate against a prospect system that gives broad control to a patentee. A patentee
might not develop a product within the scope of the original patent that provides some subset of
consumers with a benefit relative to the original product, even if a competitor would develop the
61

These benefits provide some of the justification for a recent proposal for a nonexclusive patent system. See John S. Leibovitz,
Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251 (2002) (arguing for a patent system that would grant patents
to more than one participant in the patent race).
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product in a world in which the second product were not covered by the first product’s patent.
The patentee, unlike the competitor,62 takes into account that some of the customers of the new
product will be switching from the old product. If greater product development and variety
benefit consumers,63 then broad prospect rights are likely undesirable. The existence of
alternative possible technologies to serve the same market demand serves as an additional
consideration that undermines the case that a prospect system necessarily dominates a
nonprospect system.
3. Uncertainty of Costs and Benefits of Patenting
Taken together, the analysis so far might appear to indicate that the consequence of the
delay in a prospect system between the patent grant and the date of invention is slight, at least
relative to the consequence of duplicative efforts. Delay, however, can have a pernicious effect
that assumptions underlying Figures 1 through 3 obscure. Delay increases the risk that a patentee
will decide not to develop a patent. In the analysis so far, the benefits and costs of developing a
patent are entirely predictable in advance, and so a patentee will never receive a patent that the
patentee later regrets. In the real world, however, after a patent is issued, the patentee’s estimate
of the demand for the patented product or process might change, as might the patentee’s estimate
of the cost of developing the patent. If benefits turn out to be smaller than anticipated or costs
turn out to be greater than anticipated, the patentee might decide not to invent the patent within
the patent term.
Figure 4 illustrates the result of a simulation model incorporating such uncertainty. The
simulation introduces a stochastic shock that occurs immediately after the year in which a
prospect patent would be obtained. This shock results in the anticipated benefits changing by an
amount randomly selected from a uniform distribution of -25% to 25%, and independently, the
anticipated costs changing by an amount randomly selected from the same distribution. In a
prospect system, the decision of whether and when to seek a patent will depend on these

62

The failure of a market entrant to care that some of its business is coming at the expense of existing market participants is
known in the industrial organization literature as “demand diversion” or “business stealing.” See generally N. Gregory Mankiw
& Michael D. Winston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48 (1986) (showing how this failure may lead to
economically efficient entry).
63
The economic literature on product differentiation suggests that it is possible to have too many or too few differentiated
products in an imperfectly competitive market. See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and
Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977).
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distributions. For each appropriability value (in 0.05 increments), the patent race begins in the
first year in which the average private benefit from racing is anticipated to be positive, based on
1000 simulations of the costs and benefits of patenting in different years and taking into account
the benefit of being able to delay invention after the award of the patent. Even with this relatively
simple model and relatively small level of uncertainty, Figure 4 shows that the results were
dramatic.64 The nonprospect system now easily dominates the prospect system. In a large
percentage of cases,65 the prospect patent is obtained so early that development of the invention
never occurs, and thus there are no social benefits from it. This is so even though Figure 4
assumes that two firms are competing for the patent and that the patent race will end as soon as a
patent is received.
Negative shocks are not the primary explanation for this dramatic change. Rather, the
possibility of positive shocks increases the risk of patent nondevelopment. The possibility of
positive shocks leads to earlier patenting. When patenting is relatively cheap, it might be
worthwhile to obtain a patent even at a time when it is highly unlikely that it will be practical to
develop the patent, as long as there is some chance that a patent might become worth developing.
In these cases, the inventors are obtaining patents for their option value. When they do so, there

64

In Figure 3, the prospect invention year line reflects only those cases in which the patent in fact is developed. A consideration
of the gap between receipt of a patent and the time of development thus understates the results.
65
For example, when the appropriability factor is 0.5, the invention is developed in the prospect system only 5.4% of the time.
Note that in Figure 3, the prospect invention year refers to the average year of invention only in those cases in which the
invention is in fact developed. The development rate predictably increases with higher levels of appropriability. Note that this
simulation was run beginning in 1980, not 2000, because with uncertainty, it became profitable to acquire patents earlier. The
prospect patent year line, which is cut off in the graph, descends to 1996 with appropriability = 1.0.
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is a substantial risk that they will not have enough of a patent term in which to develop their
inventions.
Nonetheless, Figure 4 should not be read as an indictment of our patent system, and
indeed this analysis might support the existing patent system, for two reasons. First, the
development of the patent sometimes will produce improvement patents. An inventor will be
willing to invest in development if that investment will have the effect of extending the patent
term. Figure 4 implausibly assumes that when there is insufficient patent term to justify
development of the invention, the invention will never be developed. More realistically, firstmover advantages eventually will make it profitable for someone (perhaps the original patentee)
to develop both the invention and a patentable improvement, in exchange for a patent on the
improvement. Of course, the same risk of nondevelopment applies to improvement patents, and
there is some risk that these too might not be developed. Nonetheless, the danger of patent
nondevelopment strengthens the case for a patent system that allows improvement patents. The
analysis thus counters arguments that improvement patents inappropriately allow patentees to
extend the lives of their patents.66
Second, and more importantly, our patent system is not a pure prospect system, but in
fact lies somewhere between the prospect and nonprospect approaches illustrated. For most
inventions, it seems likely that more than 1% of the cost of the invention process (the assumption
in Duffy’s numerical example) must be spent before the patent will issue.67 The analysis in
Figure 4 suggests only that an extreme version of a prospect system might lower social welfare
by increasing nondevelopment. The higher the hurdle for patentability, the more expensive the
patent option is, and the less expensive it will be to complete the commercialization process.
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Cf. Thomas L. Irving & Michael D. Kaminski, Double Patenting: One Way, Two Way; Whose Delay?, 1 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 180, 185-86 (1993) (considering policy justifications in support of the doctrine preventing “double patenting” of the
same invention as a means of extending patent term).
67
Further simulations reveal that if 10% of the cost of the invention process is demanded before eligibility for a patent, then the
development rate rises to about 82% if half of the social benefit is appropriable, and with 50% of the cost of the invention process
demanded, all inventions are developed, according to additional simulations. But this should not lead to complacency that
nondevelopment is a nonproblem, because the assumed shock distribution, with an absolute value averaging 12.5%, is very
conservative. With many patented products, there will be substantial uncertainty about the cost of completion and especially
about the benefit, because even many developed products turn out to be commercial disasters. With 50% of the cost of the
invention process demanded in the prospect system and an absolute average shock of 37.5%, only about 25% of inventions will
be developed and a nonprospect system produces greater social value than the prospect system. As these numbers suggest, more
empirical analysis of the information available to inventors is necessary before confident assessments about the relative merits of
a prospect system and a nonprospect system can be made. A more complete model would also need to consider the effects of
asymmetric information among racers and the possibility that different racers may have information about the relative success of
other racers’ efforts.
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Accordingly, if a greater investment is required before a patent issues, the danger that patentees
will patent so early that they will have insufficient patent term in which to develop the invention
will be lower. Assuming that with our patent system the process of invention generally costs
considerably more than 1% of the full costs of development,68 our patent system might well
strike roughly an appropriate balance between granting prospects too early and granting them too
late. Kitch’s and Duffy’s arguments in favor of a prospect system remain powerful, though
analysis of the problem of nondevelopment suggests that these arguments can be taken too far.
II. TOWARD AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

Patent underdevelopment is difficult to measure empirically. The first question is how
patentees might have behaved differently if it were possible to obtain a longer patent term, and
the second question is whether the difference in behavior would have had positive or negative
consequences for social welfare. The first question is counterfactual, and absent a natural
experiment in which some patents randomly receive patent term extensions, there is little if any
data from which we might extrapolate an answer. Measuring what is happening in the patent
system is difficult enough;69 measuring what might happen in a patent system different from the
one we have now is virtually impossible absent experimentation. And even if we knew, say, the
additional number of patents that would be commercialized given patent term extensions, the
second question would be challenging. Although scholars have made some progress in
developing methodologies for valuation of patents,70 calculating social benefits will be more
difficult still.71
Although direct empirical measurement will likely thus be impossible, we can
nonetheless make some progress on assessing the patent underdevelopment problem by
identifying particular situations in which underdevelopment or nondevelopment might arise and
thus informally inquiring into the extent of the danger. The theoretical model of Part I suggests
68

For an argument that the patent system does not in fact give as much control over future development as Kitch claims, see
Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, 5 RES. L. & ECON. 193 (1983). The
requirements for a patent, moreover, are nontrivial, so an assumption that patents are granted when only a tiny fraction of the
work is completed may be unrealistic.
69
For examples of work that seek to overcome these difficulties, see John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435
(2004); and James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation (MIT Working Paper Dept. of Econ.,
Nov. 1999).
70
See, e.g., F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of
Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175 (2003).
71
See articles cited supra note 55(seeking to measure spillovers from research activity).
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that the patent system already responds somewhat to the danger by establishing a relatively high
threshold for patentability. Part II.A develops a corollary, that the problem of patent
underdevelopment will be greatest where patent protection is provided at an early stage. In
technological fields for which the patent system most resembles a prospect system, and thus
fields in which a great deal of development must occur after patenting, patent underdevelopment
will be a danger, except to the extent that the legal system counters it. Whether patent
underdevelopment occurs also will depend on the degree to which development activities will
themselves be entitled to legal protection. Part II.B identifies three types of development
activities—scientific experimentation, market experimentation, and marketing—that produce
information that a patentee cannot protect with intellectual property. Finally, Part II.C assesses
whether the underdevelopment problem vanishes to the extent that the development activity
consists of improving the invention. Although improvements generally are patentable, some may
be unpatentable or not worth patenting, and inventors may have socially suboptimal incentives
late in the patent term to develop even patentable improvements.
A. Embryonic Inventions
The standards the existing patent system demands for granting patents are nontrivial. An
invention must be new and nonobvious, and although many commentators argue that the patent
office and courts allow many patents that ought not to be seen as meeting these requirements,72
the patent system presumably weeds out most inventions that are plainly anticipated in the prior
art, or at least in easily accessible prior art. Perhaps more importantly from our perspective, a
patentee must offer a written description of the invention that would enable a person having
ordinary skill in the art to create it.73 To meet the doctrinal requirements, an inventor ordinarily
will at least have to think carefully about the invention and about the “best mode” for practicing
it.74 The costs of inventing and of patenting are sufficiently large that inventors will at least
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See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
73
There is some debate about whether the written description and enablement requirements are distinct or one in the same. See
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear the
case en banc) (noting a “burgeoning conflict in pronouncements of this court”).
74
See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1323-24 (2002) (Rader, J., concurring) (discussing the best
mode requirement).
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hesitate if there is a very high probability that the options that the patent provides will not be
worth exercising.
Nonetheless, as John Duffy points out in a recent article, in many respects, patent law
tolerates embryonic invention. For example, “[n]o working models are required,”75 and indeed
“[t]he inventor need not ever have built or tested the invention.”76 The willingness to grant
patents early will reduce wasteful duplication and promote patent races that take place at an
earlier time,77 but, as this Article suggests, might also increase the risk of patent
underdevelopment. Eventually, the inventor will need to create a working model or build and test
the invention, if the inventor is to exercise the patent’s development option. Even if the cost of
these development activities is the same before and after patenting, because the patent system
does not require that these development activities occur before the patent is issued, the cost of
exercising the development option after receiving the patent will be greater than if these
development activities were prerequisites to receiving a patent. The higher exercise price means
that the option is less likely to be developed.
In some fields, the cost of developing inventions will be particularly high. The
pharmaceutical field is perhaps the most obvious example. Even Mark Lemley, who is generally
critical of Kitch’s prospect theory and of the possibility that the award of a patent might provide
ex post as well as ex ante benefits,78 has acknowledged that the pharmaceutical industry might be
an example in which the prospect theory is both descriptively accurate and normatively
justifiable.79 The patent system hypothetically could grant grants only after the manufacturer
receives FDA approval of the drug, based on studies establishing safety and effectiveness. But
there would be obvious problems with such a regime. Pharmaceutical companies might be less
willing to invest in the early stages of research if it were difficult to maintain their findings as
trade secrets, because other companies might specialize in testing promising substances found by
others. There is, however, a cost to the existing approach. A pharmaceutical company might
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Duffy, supra note 37, at 6; see also In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that working models need
not be submitted for patents to be obtained).
76
Duffy, supra note 37, at 6.
77
See Part I.B.2.
78
See Lemley, supra note 47.
79
Id. at 141 (“Prospect theory is needed when control over subsequent development is a necessary part of the incentive to
produce the pioneering invention in the first place, as is arguably true with pharmaceuticals.”).
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receive a patent on a drug and then not develop that drug as much as it would if patent protection
were granted at a later stage of development.
Given the uniquely high cost of developing pharmaceutical products, it should not be
surprising that there exist idiosyncratic responses to the problem of patent nondevelopment.
(Thus, once again, recognition of the problem of patent nondevelopment is as important in
helping to explain and justify existing features of the patent system as it is in suggesting the
possibility of reforms.) For example, the Orphan Drug Act provides seven years of exclusivity to
a drug company that is willing to take the drug through the clinical testing and governmental
approval processes.80 Congress recognized that even if a given medication existed, there might be
insufficient incentives for any company to conduct the scientific testing needed to establish
whether the drug is safe. Although the Act focuses specifically on drugs for diseases suffered by
200,000 or fewer individuals,81 the Act also provides for protection in cases in which in the
absence of protection, there would be no means of recovering research costs.82 The Act can even
provide for protection for a drug that still has some patent protection remaining,83 thus in effect
allowing for an extension of the patent term.
The Hatch-Waxman

Act

provides

additional

accommodations

to

the patent

underdevelopment problem.84 Hatch-Waxman provides for patent term extensions equal to half
of the time needed to investigate the new drug plus the time taken by the FDA to review the new
drug application.85 The statute thus recognizes that some inventions require greater development
time and costs and extends the patent term to reduce the risk that it will not be worthwhile to
exercise the development option, or still worse, that it will not be worthwhile to create such
inventions in the first place. Interestingly, the statute addresses the concern of patent
underdevelopment with a stick as well as a carrot. If a patentee is not diligent in developing an
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Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1994), 26
U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. II 1994), 42 U.S.C. § 236 (1994)). The seven-year exclusivity provision is found in 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a).
81
21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2)(A).
82
Id. § 360bb(a)(2)(B).
83
See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (1985).
84
For an overview of Hatch-Waxman and its legislative history, see Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999).
85
35 U.S.C. § 156. The statute, however, allows for a maximum extension period of five years, and no more than a fourteen-year
period of market exclusivity.
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invention over a period of time, the period of lack of diligence is subtracted from the sum of the
terms that is used to calculate the patent extension period.86
Within the pharmaceuticals area, one context in which the problem of patent
underdevelopment might be particularly acute is genomics. Identifying a genetic sequence is
only the first step toward identifying a particular therapeutic use for that sequence, and one
danger of granting patents in gene sequences is that by the time research develops to the point
where a therapeutic use might be on the horizon, the patent might have expired,87 or too little
patent term will be available to make research financially worthwhile. Nonetheless, property
rights in genetic sequences might be useful to reduce the danger of duplicative research and to
assure potential researchers that others will not free-ride off their efforts. The Patent and
Trademark Office’s Utility Guidelines provide a partial solution to this problem,88 requiring that
applications for gene sequences demonstrate a specific and substantial utility, but it is possible
that broader property rights coupled with a longer patent term might increase development
incentives.
Industry-specific responses such as the Orphan Drug Act, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and
the Utility Guidelines help limit the danger of patent underdevelopment, and the theory
developed in this paper provides a justification for including such legal regimes as supplements
to the patent system within our system of innovation. Nonetheless, the existence of such
protection cannot provide confidence that the patent system has entirely conquered the danger of
patent underdevelopment. Genomic inventions provide one example of a field in which these
responses might be inadequate to foster an optimal amount of further research and development,
and there is no guarantee that the additional periods of exclusivity provided by the Orphan Drug
Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act will be long enough even for non-genomic drugs. Moreover, it
remains possible that there exist many individual inventions in other technological fields that

86

Id. § 271(e)(1) (overturning the result of Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
The genomics revolution also presents a related problem: Once it becomes feasible to test many people for individual genetic
variations, testing of many existing treatments will be needed to determine which groups can benefit from those treatments, but in
the absence of protection for the underlying treatments, there will be little incentive to engage in such testing. See Arti K. Rai,
Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan Drugs, and Distributive Justice: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 19 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 246, 249-51 (2002).
88
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). The concern animating the Guidelines was not the problem
of patent nondevelopment, but simply the concern that patents were being granted without sufficient inventive accomplishment.
See generally Lawrence T. Kass & Michael N. Nitabach, A Roadmap for Biotechnology Patents? Federal Circuit Precedent and
the PTO’s New Examination Guidelines, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 233 (2002) (providing an overview of the Guidelines).
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would be developed if only more patent term remained. Although “prophetic”89 claiming of
anticipated research results is particularly significant in the biotechnology sector,90 it occurs in
other technological areas as well,91 and generally signals that continued development will be
necessary after the patent is issued. The next section identifies the specific types of development
that patentees might not perform.
B. Nonpatentable Development
One possible solution to the problem of patent underdevelopment is for the patent system
to reward development activity with a patent term extension. We have seen that the HatchWaxman Act adopts a version of this approach,92 and later we will consider the possibility of a
systematic approach to patent term extensions.93 The patent system, however, already has a builtin mechanism providing additional patent term for development activities: the system of
improvement patents. If an improvement to a patented invention or inventions itself meets the
criteria for patentability, an improvement patent issues.94 When the recipient of an improvement
patent is a third party, then both the original inventor and the third party own “blocking” rights
preventing the other from practicing the new technology during the term of the relevant patents.95
When the original inventor receives an improvement patent, then there is no blocking, but the
original inventor receives a fresh patent term, although third parties will be permitted to practice
the original invention after the end of the original term.
By providing an exclusivity reward for improving the original invention, the patent
system might encourage some development activity that otherwise would not have occurred as a
result of the finite patent term. Nonetheless, improvement patents cannot serve as a complete
solution to the problem of patent nondevelopment. The primary reason is that some forms of
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Under patent claiming rules, “[s]imulated or predicted test results and prophetical examples . . . are permitted in patent
applications.” PTO Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 608.01(p)(D) (2005).
90
See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner & Stephen Maebius, The Global Biotech Patent Application, 666 PLI/Pat. 87, 96-97 (2001)
(discussing the challenges of prophetic claiming of biotech patents).
91
See, e.g., Energy Absorption Sys. v. Roadway Safety Srvcs., Inc., 1997 WL 368379, **5 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing the
prophetic examples doctrine in the context of a mechanical invention).
92
See supra notes 84- 86and accompanying text.
93
See infra Part III.
94
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
95
See generally Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons
in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 168 (2004) (explaining the phenomenon of blocking patents).
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patent development do not themselves entitle the original patent holders to new patents.96 If third
parties will be able at least partly to free-ride on such development activities after the patent
term, patentees might have insufficient incentive to engage in them during the patent term. These
include investments to perform studies assessing the effectiveness of the invention, to test
commercially the public’s demand for the invention, and to inform consumers or others about the
invention.
1. Scientific Testing
The most obvious, though perhaps not the commercially most significant, form of
unpatentable development activity is scientific testing of an invention.97 The need to encourage
scientific testing of inventions is particular acute for pharmaceuticals, thus helping to explain
particular statutory responses such as the Orphan Drug Act.98 A wide range of inventions,
however, might benefit from further testing to see how well the invention will perform. If an
invention will not perform well, then the product might be less likely to be commercially
successful, so the decision to engage in scientific testing may be a prelude to a later decision
whether to fully commercialize an invention.

It is also possible that some patentees will

commercialize products without testing them (and thus without finding solutions to potential
problems), and the incentive to take this approach is greater, the lower the amount of patent term
remaining.
The patent system could not easily adapt by granting improvement patents on scientific
testing, because it generally is not possible to distinguish the scientifically tested invention from
the original. If any scientific testing of an invention were sufficient to entitle a patent holder to a
new patent, that would provide a mechanism for extending virtually all patent terms ad infinitum,
unless patent offices were to apply a subjective test of whether the scientific testing is
sufficiently important to justify a patent term extension. An important exception is that it is
possible to obtain patents on new uses for existing inventions,99 so to the extent that research
96

An additional reason is that the incentives provided by improvement patents even for patentable development activities may be
suboptimal. See infra Part II.C.
97
Kitch recognized the importance of scientific testing of inventions after patents are issued, but assumed that the underlying
patent itself would provide sufficient incentives. See Kitch, supra note 10, at 277 (“Absent a patent, firms have less than the
optimal incentive to invest in providing information about and techniques for using the new technology.”). Even with a patent,
the finite length of protection means that firms’ incentives to engage in such investments are less than optimal.
98
See supra notes 80- 83and accompanying text.
99
See, e.g., Joseph M. Reisman, Physicians and Surgeons as Inventors: Reconciling Medical Process Patents and Medical
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points to a new use, the patentee may be entitled to an improvement patent. For example, a use
patent might cover the use of a drug for a new medical condition. Such improvement patents,
however, may be difficult to obtain, because the possibility of the “new” use might have been
obvious, even if it would not have been obvious that the new use would have been effective. A
use patent also might be difficult to enforce enforce, because the patentee might not be able to
obtain reliable information on whether particular consumers are using the invention for its
original or new purpose, or why sellers are encouraging consumers to use the invention.100
The courts, unsurprisingly, have been skeptical of efforts to obtain broad patent
protection for scientific studies. For example, the Federal Circuit recently upheld the invalidation
of a patent for growing and eating cruciferous sprouts, such as broccoli, to reduce the level of
carcinogenic substances and thus possibly the risk of cancer.101 “While [the patentee] may have
recognized something about sprouts that was not known before,” the court concluded, the
patentee’s “claims do not describe a new method.”102 The patentee argued that in fact it had
discovered a new method, such as a method for “selecting the particular seeds that will germinate
as sprouts rich in glucosinolates,”103 but with this claim rejected, there was no possibility for
additional patent protection. Cruciferous sprouts, of course, were not under patent protection, but
just as the Federal Circuit’s decision means that the patent system itself may not provide the
incentive to research known but unproven scientific hypotheses about public domain products, so
too does it mean that the patent system might provide only a limited incentive for patentees to
research their own products. Given the difficulty that the courts would have in determining the
extent to which a particular experiment reduced scientific uncertainty, the decision is likely a
good one, but it means that non-patent innovation incentives, such as governmental scientific
grants, may be needed as an adjunct to the patent system, even to encourage research on patented
or once-patented inventions.
The empirical uncertainty is how often patentees neglect to engage in scientific
experimentation that they would have engaged in with a longer patent term. There exists at least
Ethics, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J.355, 389 -91 (1995).
100
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005) (“The discovery
of a new use for an old drug might support a patent on a method of treatment, but such a patent offers little effective protection
against generic competition once the drug itself is off-patent and may lawfully be sold for an older, unpatented use.”).
101
See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
102
Id. at 1352.
103
Id. at 1351.
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anecdotal evidence that drug makers are less willing to conduct trials near patent expiration. For
example, a New York Times editorial criticized NitroMed for conducting full testing of its heart
failure drug, BiDil, only in a population of African-American patients.104 “Some experts believe
that . . . it would have been possible to devise a better study to test the drug in a broad
population, not just a single racial group,” according to The Times. But with the patent on the
underlying drug expiring in 2007, NitroMed had insufficient incentive to conduct tests on the
population as a whole, and so it targeted only a narrow group, recognizing that it could obtain a
use patent for using the drug to benefit a targeted group.105 If enough patent term remained on the
underlying drug, then NitroMed might have had an incentive also to test the drug on a broader
population. Although NitroMed still engaged in some testing of the drug, there might be other
patentees that decide to stop scientific testing altogether, when they might have made a different
decision with a longer patent term. The empirical problem, of course, is that it is difficult to
determine whether a particular decision not to engage in testing is attributable to the limited
amount of patent term remaining.
2. Commercial Experimentation
There is an additional type of experimentation that patents generally encourage, but
which may be suboptimal as a result of the limited patent term: commercial experimentation.
Some inventions might be obviously worth commercializing, and in far more cases, by the end of
the patent term, it will become apparent that the underlying inventions are not worth
commercializing. But there might be some inventions that could be commercially successful.
Patent protection, F. Scott Kieff has argued, helps to provide incentives for commercial
experimentation on patented products, because in the absence of such protection, third parties
might be able to free-ride off the information from the inventor’s commercial experiments.106 A
corollary is that the limited patent term will mean that a patentee might not engage in some
commercial experiments that the patentee would engage in with a longer patent term.

104

The First Race-Based Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 4 (Week in Review), at 11.
Id. NitroMed received U.S. Patent No. 6,784,177 (2004).
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F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 708-09 (2001)
(noting the possibility of second-mover advantages when “mere knowledge of a first mover’s success eliminates a great deal of
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The problem is particularly severe for inventions that have a small probability of large
commercial success, and a great probability of failure. Once an invention falls into the public
domain, someone considering commercializing the invention faces the prospect of bearing the
entire cost of the experimentation if it turns out to be a failure. If it turns out to be a success,
however, the initial innovator will enjoy only a fraction of the benefits, because third parties will
enter the market and take some portion of market share. As a result of trademark protection, the
original experimenter is likely to enjoy a larger market share than subsequent entrants,107 but
entry by third parties will dissipate at least some of the rents that the initial commercial
experimenter would enjoy in a regime of perpetual patent protection. Because of other costs of
perpetual protection, we have only protection for a limited time, and inventors will forego at
least some experiments that they otherwise would have undertaken.
Given the considerable gap that often exists between the date of invention and initial
commercial experimentation for many products for which experimentation does eventually take
place,108 the finite patent term might discourage many commercial experiments. That does not
mean that the underlying inventions will never be commercially tested. Eventually, as the
potential market for an invention grows and the cost of producing it falls, it might be worth it to
some entrepreneur to perform the commercial test, enjoying whatever advantages lead-time and
trademark law provide. But commercialization might be considerably delayed as a result of the
finite patent term. Once again, calculating how long such delays are in practice might be an
empirical impossibility. Because commercial experimentation is common in all technological
areas, however, the absence of sufficient incentives for commercial experimentation might be a
more serious problem than the absence of sufficient incentives for scientific experimentation.
3. Marketing and Advertising
Even once a patentee has fully scientifically tested an invention and has decide to
commercialize it, the patentee must decide how much marketing and advertising to engage in.
Some commentators argue that advertising can be economically efficient because it serves to
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provide information to consumers and may result in lower prices.109 The less patent term
remaining, the less advertising patentees can be expected to engage in, because third parties can
enter the market and free-ride off the advertising investment. This finding does have empirical
support. Studies suggest, for example, that pharmaceutical companies sharply cut back on
marketing expenses shortly before a patent falls into the public domain.110
The more difficult empirical question is the extent to which advertising is socially
suboptimal. Some economists suggest, for example, that advertising may be socially excessive,
for example leading consumers to purchase products that in fact they do not need.111 To the
extent that this is so, the finite patent term will tend to raise rather than lower social welfare. On
the other hand, by introducing competition, the finite patent term might increase one form of
inefficient advertising, seeking to induce customers to purchase from one producer rather than
from another, even where there are no real quality differences.112 Any complete empirical
analysis thus seems likely to produce different conclusions for different inventions, though at
least in some situations, the finiteness of the patent term might lead to less useful and more
useless information being provided to consumers.
C. Patentable Improvements
The analysis so far has focused on development activities that produce information off
which a third party can free-ride. To the extent that a development activity results not just in
information, but in a new patentable invention, we have seen that the possibility of an
improvement patent can provide for renewed patent protection, thus reducing the danger of
patent nondevelopment.113 The possibility of improvement patents, however, does not mean that
incentives to engage in research expected to lead to improved inventions will always be optimal.
Consider first incentives during the original patent term. Suppose a potential inventor
anticipates that research will lead to improvements that, if incorporated into the patentee’s
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product, could lead to an additional $1 million of profit for the patentee during the original patent
term. If the patentee is the potential inventor, then the patentee will be able to retain all the
additional profits that result from improvements during the patent term. Patenting the
improvement might produce spillovers in the form of information or consumer surplus, but this
is always the case.114 Third parties, however, may have suboptimal incentives to create
improvements, even placing aside concerns about spillovers. Because each of the patentee and
the improver can block the other from practicing the invention during the patent term, the parties
will have to negotiate an agreement, meaning that the surplus from the improvement must be
shared between the improver and the patentee. Sometimes, a patentee might seek to precommit
to giving a relatively large portion of this surplus to improvers as a way of generating more
improvements,115 but it may be difficult to fashion such precommitments. Thus, at least
considering only the remainder of the patent term, the incentives of a third-party improver to
engage in research and development may be suboptimal.
The economics of improvements become more complicated once we consider the years
following the conclusion of the original patent term. The problem is that different improvements
may be substitutes for one another. Suppose, to take an extreme example, that there are two
mutually incompatible improvements to an invention, and either of these improvements would
allow the patentee of that improvement to earn an additional $1 million in profit. If both
improvements are created, however, each might be worth only $500,000, or even less as a result
of price competition between the rival improvers. The possibility of a second improver ironically
might mean in some circumstances that no one will improve at all, or that improvements will
come later. The danger of inadequate incentives will be especially acute if the first improvement
produces valuable information about the size of the market.116
This concern can be understood through the lens of recent developments in the prospect
theory of patent law discussed above.117 Because patent protection provides considerable control
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over the development of improvements, a patentee need not worry too much about competition
from rival improvers,118 and a patentee need not worry at all about the prospect of rivals making
substitutes to its own improvements, because the patentee can block such improvements during
the patent term. This provides the patentee with assurance that it will be able to reap the benefits
of its research and development on improvements, potentially leading to earlier and greater
investment. Once the patent falls into the public domain, however, this benefit is lost, and so also
when only a relatively short portion of a patent term remains, incentives to make improvements
might be suboptimal. Because of the possibility of losing a hypothetical patent race to improve a
patent nearing expiratino, both the patentee and third parties might not yet find it worthwhile to
enter the patent race. The possibility of improvement patents, to be sure, means that there will be
considerably better incentives to engage in development activities that might produce such
patents, but aggregate investment even in such activities might be lower than if a longer patent
term remained.
Improvement patents also will not encourage development activities that might produce
improvements that will not subsequently receive patent protection. One reason that
improvements might not be patented is that they might not themselves meet the standards of
patentability. For example, the Patent and Trademark Office might conclude that a particular
improvement would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art,119 even
though such a person will obviously not work for free. Even some valuable and innovative
improvements might not be entitled to patent protection,120 though the Office’s relatively relaxed
standards suggest that this problem at least is not so severe.121 Even if all improvements are
potentially patentable under current patent administration practices, however, some
improvements might be too small to justify the expense of patent prosecution.122 These concerns
might be of relatively little economic significance, but they provide a further basis for worry that
the end of patent protection might decrease development expenses.
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III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

The analysis so far suggests a central tradeoff that patent law presents, a post-patenting
version of the classic tradeoff between providing incentives to invent and ensuring access to
inventions. If a patent term is too short, the patentee might have socially insufficient incentives
to develop the patent by engaging in nonpatentable research and commercialization activities,
but if it is too long, excessive deadweight loss will result. The difficulty is that this tradeoff
cannot simply be optimized, even in theory, by setting the patent term to an appropriate length,
because if a patent race amounts to an implicit patent auction,123 longer nominal patent terms will
push inventive activity earlier and thus result in shorter effective patent terms.
An alternative approach might be to allow patentees some power to delay the issuance of
their patents, and indeed the practice of continuing applications, combined with the old system
that measured patent life from issuance effectively accomplished this. There were serious
drawbacks to this system, including the creation of “submarine patents” that defeated the
reasonable expectations of other inventors.124 In theory, of course, the patent system could
provide a formal mechanism for allowing delayed initial effectiveness of a patent, while still
ensuring immediate issuance. An inventor would then be able to delay patent issuance until the
patent is most valuable. An additional benefit of the system is that it would encourage invention
of fundamental building block technologies long before they become commercially useful. There
would, however, be drawbacks. In some cases, a delay would amount to no more than an
extension of the patent monopoly, because other firms would not be willing to use a technology
that they knew would later fall under patent protection. In other cases, firms might not delay
despite the danger of patent underdevelopment, because of the reputational benefits of being first
to market.
As a practical matter, the patent system accommodates the concern about patent
underdevelopment with a separate policy lever, the designation of the quantum of achievement
required before a patent will be awarded. Requiring more achievement reduces the risk of patent
underdevelopment but increases inefficient duplication. Insisting on up-front investment to
decrease the risk of later lack of investment is a crude policy response. The policy lever must be
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exercised at the beginning of the patent term, when the risk of nondevelopment will be least
clear. Thus, even if the patent system sought to take into account nondevelopment risk in
determining whether a patent should issue, a difficult factor to tailor to particular patents in any
event, it would be making that assessment prematurely. This leaves two possible sets of
strategies for penalizing nondevelopment: one involving a stick, and the other a carrot. The stick
approach would impose an affirmative requirement that the patentee proceed with development.
Europe adopts such an affirmative requirement by demanding compulsory licensing in the
absence of development.125 A more drastic affirmative requirement, which Oren Bar-Gill and
Gideon Parchomovsky come close to endorsing in a brief discussion in a recent article,126 would
be to provide that such patents should be placed in the public domain. These approaches run into
serious problems. Presumably, mere token development expenses would not count, but that
means courts would need to engage in a difficult line-drawing problem to determine how much
development should count as enough. More worrisome, such legal requirements might encourage
patentees to engage in modest wasteful “fake development” simply to preserve the value of their
development options.
There is, however, an even more fundamental problem with the stick approach, that the
remedy might be worse than the disease. Once the patent is in the public domain, nobody will
have an incentive to develop it,127 and probably no one will develop a product through a
compulsory license when the initial patentee did not think that development without having to
pay a license fee would be profitable. The infeasibility of the stick approach thus suggests that a
carrot is needed instead, but it would be hard to develop a suitable carrot within the patent term.
To be sure, the government can provide research subsidies, but it would be difficult to target
those subsidies to situations in which nondevelopment is a particular danger. A carrot is probably
best offered near the end of the patent term. At this point, it might be clearer what additional
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development activities extra patent term might enable, and it might also be easier to determine
the cost of a longer period of protection. There might be instances, for example, it which it might
be clear that a product simply will not be developed in the absence of a patent extension, even if
the patent is placed in the public domain, and thus that the public would be better off with a
patent extension than without it.
A relatively naïve way to implement the carrot would be for Congress to grant patent
extensions on an ad hoc basis, or for an administrative agency to do so. In the early nineteenth
century, Congress did occasionally grant patent term extensions in individual cases.128 In the
1980s, Congress enacted a few specific extensions to compensate patentees for time lost to
premarket review by the Food and Drug Administration,129 and in 1984, Congress enacted a
systematic patent extension program for inventions that required FDA premarket review.130
Pharmaceuticals might well be a category of invention in which the risk of nondevelopment is
likely to be particularly high, because of the expensive and nonpatentable commercialization
activities that must be undertaken.131 The congressional action, however, appeared to be based
more on fairness concerns than on concrete concerns about patent nondevelopment. The
predictable result of any case-by-case patent extension grants is rent-seeking, and the patents
most likely to justify lobbying expense and thus to receive extensions are likely to be those that
have already shown strong commercial success, not necessarily those that need additional time.
Of course, the anticipation of the possibility of an extension might stimulate additional
development effort, but an ad hoc case-by- case extension system provides little guarantee that
extensions will be anything but windfalls. In short, the carrot should not be too sweet.
Patent extension auctions provide a straightforward means of providing patent extensions
in particular cases in which patent underdevelopment seems likely to be a danger without
creating windfalls. In a simple patent extension auction regime, the right to a patent extension
term would be auctioned to the highest bidder, which might not be the same as the original
patentee. The same approach can be used for copyrights. William Landes and Richard Posner
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have suggested that indefinite copyright terms might be optimal,132 but this argument by itself
does not justify providing copyright holders with the windfall of copyright extensions. As John
Duffy has pointed out, if the benefits of extending existing copyright terms exceed the costs in
deadweight loss, this still might be accomplished by auctioning the copyright rather than
granting the extension automatically to the copyright holder.133 A straightforward second-price
sealed bid auction134 can allow the holder of an intellectual property right to receive an extension,
but only by paying to the government what the intellectual property right would be worth to the
next highest valuer. If the original right holder wins the auction, the right holder will still receive
only a small windfall, equal to the difference between its valuation and the second-highest
valuation of the right. And expectation of such small windfalls would slightly strengthen the
reward function of the intellectual property system, increasing incentives for and thus investment
in future inventions and copyrights, so in the long run these small windfalls would not be a
transfer payment but part of the incentive to create.
That patent extension auctions can largely eliminate windfalls while reducing the risk of
patent nondevelopment does not mean that they are optimal. The extension of a patent term, like
the extension of a copyright term, will impose a deadweight loss, and thus an auction should
occur only when the social benefit of reducing the risk of nondevelopment, exceeds costs,
including in addition to deadweight loss, the administrative costs of the auction and the research
costs of bidders. Parts III.A and III.B will consider two alternative decisionmakers for
determining when patent extension auctions should occur: the government and the patentholder
itself, constrained by an auction mechanism that will provide an incentive to call for an auction
only in the situations in which such an auction will generally be optimal. Although I will make
the case that both approaches might increase welfare, the possibility of giving the patentholder
incentives to make an appropriate decision is the more intriguing. Because patent law applies
largely in the same way to all technology classes and all inventions,135 variables such as the
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patent term necessarily reflect crude attempts at balancing benefits and costs. Although
government might seek to tailor patents to the characteristics of particular inventions,136 the task,
if feasible, is more likely to be accomplished by harnessing the information of private parties.
A. Government-Decreed Patent Extension Auctions
Let us first consider a regime in which the government could decide case by case whether
to auction a patent extension. Conceivably, such an auction might take place just when a patent
was about to fall into the public domain, ensuring that there would be additional years in which
development activities could occur. A problem with this approach is that the patentee would
have little incentive to engage in nonpatentable development activities in the final years of the
patent term. For example, a marketing campaign to make consumers aware of the benefits of a
patented product might be useful primarily to ensure robust sales after the patent is set to
expire.137 Even if the patentee anticipates that the patent extension will be auctioned at the end of
the patent term, the patentee will be unable to harness these benefits. A patent extension will be
worth more to all bidders as a result of the auction, and thus the marketing campaign would
increase the amount that the patentee would have to pay at auction to receive the patent.
For example, assuming a cash auction with payment due to the government,138 a
marketing campaign that would cost $500,000 and increase the value of the patent during the
extension period by a present discounted value of $1,000,000 would not be worthwhile. The
patentee would have to pay the $1,000,000 in the form of a higher bid, and so, if the marketing
campaign did not affect pre-expiration sales, even anticipating victory in the auction, the
campaign would end up costing $1,500,000 for $1,000,000 in benefit. Of course, a patent
extension auction immediately following patent expiration might still be justified. If the
extension is for a sufficiently long period, then the winner of the auction, whether the original
patentee or a third party, will have an incentive to launch the marketing campaign. The
that although the rules of patent law are the same across technology areas, the application of those rules may and should differ
somewhat).
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campaign, however, will have been inefficiently delayed until the expiration of the original
patent term.
An alternative approach would be to auction the patent extension before the end of the
patent term. For example, five years before the end of the patent term, the government might
hold an auction for the patent right in a period immediately following the patent term. That way,
if the patentee won the extension, the patentee would have an incentive to continue development
activity in the closing years of the patent term. Even if a third party won the extension, the
patentee and the auction winner might negotiate agreements to ensure continued development,
with the auction winner paying some of the costs of the development. A challenge in executing
this approach is to determine just when the auction should be held. The earlier the patent
extension auction occurs, the weaker will be information about whether it is necessary. Holding
the patent extension auction at the beginning of the patent term would provide the strongest
assurance against patent nondevelopment, at least assuming the patentee wins the extension, but
the least confidence about whether the benefits of the patent extension auction are worth the
additional deadweight loss.
The central question for government-decreed patent extension auctions is whether the
government, either acting through Congress or through an administrative agency, will do a good
job in determining when to hold the auctions. False negatives—inefficient decisions not to hold
auctions—at least leave the patent system no worse than the status quo, but false positives could
mean unjustified increases in deadweight loss. The attraction of auction revenue might lead the
government to hold auctions that amount to inefficient taxes. Of course, this is nothing new. The
government always must make decisions about how to raise revenue. Even if a particular auction
is inefficient, it might be less so than the alternative means of raising the same revenue.
Auctioning monopoly rights to fields that could be competitive seems in general likely to be an
inefficient approach to revenue generation,139 but if such auctions allow patentees to internalize
the benefits of their development expenses,140 they might well raise welfare. The question, a
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difficult one, is whether adding an additional option to the revenue menu will tend to increase
efficiency or decrease it.
An important consideration is the effect of the government’s power on rent-seeking
activities. Because auctions limit the windfalls that private parties will receive, they will generate
less rent-seeking than pure government largesse. The auction itself provides a mechanism for
dissipating rents, and so additional rent dissipation will occur only to the extent that there is a
single party that will benefit in particular from an auction. With patent extension auctions, the
patentee will generally be eager to lobby for patent extension auctions only if it believes that it
will win and have a substantial advantage over other potential bidders. One such advantage is
that of continuous ownership, that the patentee, unlike any third party, will be able to capture the
benefits of development activities that occur during the original patent term, including both
benefits realized during the original patent term and benefits realized during the extension
period. Thus, although other factors might also give a patentee an advantage over third parties,141
patentees will have a greater incentive to lobby for patent extension auctions when the costs of
nondevelopment are great. The lobbying expenses are still a social cost, but at least there is a
rough correlation between cases in which patentees will seek extension auctions and cases in
which such extension auctions will be socially beneficial.
B. Patentee-Decreed Patent Extension Auctions
The social cost of lobbying expenses, however, can be reduced by giving a patentee the
exclusive power to seek a patent extension auction. The danger is that the patentee will elect the
extension auction option inefficiently. A patentee might anticipate that it will have some
advantage over other bidders, but this advantage might not be the advantage of continuous
ownership, of being able to capture returns to development both within the original patent term
and beyond. For example, the patent might be complementary to another patent in the patentee’s
portfolio, or the patent might help the patentee to extend its monopoly into another market.142
Ideally, we would like the patentee to elect the option only when the advantage that it enjoys is
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attributable to ownership continuity.143 A relatively simple auction regime can provide a
reasonable assurance that this is the case. Part III.B.1 describes this mechanism, and Part III.B.2
considers whether a similar mechanism might be used to determine patent scope when a patent
initially is awarded.
1. TheMechanism
The auction mechanism would work as follows: Congress would specify a field of
technology, or perhaps even individual patents, in which patent underdevelopment seems likely
to be a problem. In theory, Congress might apply the auction mechanism to the entire patent
system, but at least initially, much more narrow experimentation would be preferable. In the
authorized field, a patentee at any time would be able to request an auction for a patent extension
and to specify, perhaps within limits, the length of time of that extension. The patentee initially
would not bid in the auction. Third parties, however, would have a chance to bid, and the
patentee would then be given an opportunity to purchase the patent extension for a set markup
over the top bid. For example, if the statute authorizing patent extension auctions declared the
markup to be 25%, and the high bid at the auction were $1,000,000 for the patent extension, then
the patentee would have an opportunity to purchase the patent extension for $1,250,000.144 If the
patentee declined the purchase, then the high bidder would win the auction, paying an amount
equal to the bid of the second-highest bidder.145
An auction that results in the patent being transferred to a third party might be a social
failure, for such auctions would increase deadweight loss without increasing the incentive to
develop the patent within the original patent term.146 The third parties must, however, have some
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incentive to participate in the process to ensure a competitive bidding regime. The trick is to
ensure that the patentee will have an incentive to call for an auction only when it actually expects
that it will have a strong probability of winning, and yet to ensure at least some reasonable thirdparty bids. The patentee will ordinarily already have some incentive not to call for an auction
that it does not expect to win, because it might be worse off with a patent in the hands of a third
party than with the patent in the public domain, particularly if it wishes directly to sell a good or
service represented by the patent. But it would be straightforward to add additional incentives,
for example requiring a patentee to pay the high bidder a penalty percentage of its high bid
should the patentee end up declining the option to purchase the patent.147 This would have the
additional benefit of increasing auction competitiveness. Auction competitiveness also might be
furthered by promising to give to the high bidder a percentage of the purchase price in cases in
which the patentee does exercise the patent extension option.
2. The Details
a. Post-Auction Sales of Term Extensions

Two rules are essential in cases in which the patent is purchased by someone other than
the original patentee:
First, the purchaser cannot be allowed during the original patent term to sell the patent
extension to the original patentee. Otherwise, even where a patentee is clearly the most efficient
patent owner, a third party’s bid will be based on its estimate of the original patentee’s valuation.
The difference between what the original patentee is willing to pay and what the third party
would be willing to pay would be attributable to the anticipated combined bargaining costs of the
transfer negotiation. The auction mechanism will work appropriately only if the difference is
largely attributable instead to the benefit of development of the patent within the original patent
term. To force the third party to consider only its own valuation of the patent, and not the
possible increased benefits from patent development, the third party must not be allowed to resell
arrive at a value to compensate the patent holder, in this case the winner of the patent extension at the initial auction. There are
obvious affinities between my proposal and Kremer’s; we both seek to use information from bids for patents at auction to
overcome problems with the patent system. The ends, however, are opposite. Kremer’s proposal is potentially useful when there
are efficiency advantages to placing a patent in the public domain, while the approach described here is useful when there are
efficiency reasons to prevent a patent from falling into the public domain. They could, however, be combined to account for
cases in which the patentee’s initial decision turns out to be a mistake.
147
The optimal markup would decline with an increase in the penalty percentage, because the penalty percentage would make
the option of declining the patent extension less attractive.
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the patent during the patent term. Likewise, the original patentee should not be allowed to sell
the remainder of the original patent term to the purchaser of the extension period.
Second, the purchaser should be allowed to sell the patent extension to the original
patentee after the original patent term has expired (or once expiration is so close that it would be
too late for the original patentee to engage in further meaningful patent development within the
patent term). One reason is that this will ensure that the patent is held by the highest-valuing
user. A more important reason is that this assures that at patent extension auctions in general, the
difference between the original patentee’s valuation and the third party’s valuation is attributable
to the benefit of development of the patent within the original patent term, and not to some other
factor that makes the patent particularly valuable to the patentee. Critically, this rule will not
undermine the previous one. A patentee who loses a patent extension auction will not ordinarily
be willing to undertake development costs in the hope of recouping them by buying the patent
extension after the original patent term expires. Because the development would make the patent
more valuable, the patentee would have to pay the extension right holder for the increase in value
attributable to the patentee’s own development expenses.
Suppose, for example, that a patent needs no further development, but it is twice as
valuable to the patentee than to the highest-valuing third-party bidder. Because no further
development is needed, the unique value to the patentee must come from market power during
the patent extension term, for example because the patent will have more value as part of a patent
portfolio than alone.148 If a third party could not sell the patent extension back to the original
patentee during or after the original patent term, then the third party would not incorporate this
unique value into its bid. Thus, as long as the markup were less than 100% (and disregarding the
possibility of penalties in the interest of simplicity), the patentee would win the patent extension,
for reasons contrary to the goals of the patent extension auction system. But as long as the third
party anticipates being able to sell the patent extension back to the original patentee, it will
anticipate being able to capture the full amount of the markup and thus will bid as much as the
patentee. Anticipating this result, the patentee will not call for an auction in the first place.
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See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 24 (arguing that patents may be more valuable as part of patent portfolios
than alone).
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b. Determination of the Markup

Aside from determining whether contracts assigning patents meet the above rules and
from oversight in conducting the auction, the auction mechanism would involve no government
intervention. Patentholders would have an incentive to call for and then win an auction only
where the benefits of patent ownership continuity are sufficiently great to justify the markup.
The challenge for the government is to determine the size of the required markup. If the
government sets too low a markup, then relatively small benefits from continuity will lead to
auctions, even if significant deadweight loss results. Our existing patent system, which does not
allow extensions, is tantamount to a system with an infinite markup. Initially, a government
creating a system of patent extension auctions might start with a very high markup, so that only a
few auctions would be held, and studies could assess whether the extensions benefited the public.
The markup might then gradually be lowered if patent extension auctions appeared to increase
welfare. Conceivably, the government might eventually offer different markups for different
patents, because the amount of deadweight loss might vary depending on factors such as the ease
with which price discrimination can be accomplished, though individuation would encourage
rent-seeking.
Though perhaps varying across patents, a simple algebraic argument suggests that a first
approximation of the value of the optimal markup might be 25%. Let m represent the markup, let
v represent the total value of the patent extension to the highest-valuing third-party user, let s
represent the social benefit of increased ability to develop the patent, and let p represent the
proportion of this benefit that the patentee will privately capture. The patentee will call for an
auction if ps > mv. The government would like to induce an auction if and only if s > d, where d
is the deadweight loss. Thus, the government should set m = pd/v. With linear demand, d/v =
0.5.149 Meanwhile, the patentee is unlikely to be able to perfectly price-discriminate, but a
reasonable assumption might be that the additional producer surplus attributable to the
development will be equal to the additional consumer surplus, so p = 0.5. Therefore, the
government should set m = 0.25. To be sure, these assumptions are gross simplifications, and the
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See, e.g., Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented
Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 132 n.21 (1997) (“When facing linear demand and zero marginal cost, a
monopolist maximizes profit by selling to exactly half the consumers. Geometrically, this means that [consumer surplus] =
[deadweight loss] = (0.5 * [producer surplus]).”).
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analysis assumes perfect information on the part of the patentee, thus disregarding the possibility
that the patentee will ever need to pay a fine.
3. The Variations
a. Alternative Auction Currencies

We have assumed so far that the auction “currency” would be cash payable to the
government. In a separate article on the possibility that auctions of rights to inventive fields
might serve as alternatives to the patent system, I noted that such auctions might use different
currencies.150 The same argument applies to the patent extension auctions contemplated here. A
benefit of the cash-to-government approach is, of course, that it provides the government with
revenue. Alternative auction currencies, however, potentially can help advance specific goals of
the patent extension auction system. Two such currencies will be considered immediately below;
it would also be possible for the government to hold a “multiple currency auction,”151 using some
formula to aggregate bids that span different components.
First, the currency might be cash to be invested in development activities, rather than
cash to be paid to the government. If the patentholder in fact intends to engage in substantial
development activity during the remaining original patent term, then the patentholder will tend to
be willing to spend more than the high bidder, which would not have incentives to spend money
until after the patent term. The cases in which the patentholder would spend significantly more
on development are precisely the cases in which additional deadweight loss from a patent
extension is worth suffering, so the logic above applies even more clearly. This approach would
encourage more total investment in patent development than the cash-to-government approach.
A weakness of this approach is that it limits the auction winner’s flexibility if changes in
circumstances make further patent development inadvisable. In addition, for this approach to
work, the government needs to be able to asses whether funds are in fact being spent on
development activities.152
Second, if injunctive relief were disallowed in patent extension periods, the currency
could be patent damages. Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer have noted that in the absence of
150

See Michael Abramowicz, Patent Auctions (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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injunctions, lowering patent damages in effect reduces the price that patentees will charge for
their inventions.153

Patentees will set prices anticipating the possibility of unauthorized

competition, and patentees and licensees negotiate in the shadow of eventual lawsuits. The
winning bidder in the initial auction therefore might be the party that offers to accept the smallest
proportion of patent damages. The original patentee would receive a patent extension only if it
agrees to accept an even smaller proportion of patent damages. This system therefore would
require a markdown, rather than a markup. The benefit of this approach is that lower prices
reduce deadweight loss, so if a significant concern is that patent term extensions will result in
continued high prices for consumers, this approach partly offsets the concern.
A problem with this approach is that agreements to charge only low prices reintroduce
the problem of patent underdevelopment. If the goal is to encourage development, then allowing
a patentee to capture only a small proportion of surplus can be counterproductive. Particularly
troubling here, a third party could offer the best bid by agreeing to only nominal damages, and
then the patentee could accept even more nominal damages, but then not develop the patent any
further. Thus, a bid for a low price would likely need to be accompanied also by some form of
cash payment or investment commitment, so that the level of patent damages would not be too
low. The greater the amount of cash commitment, the less danger that the auction currency itself
will reintroduce the problem of patent underdevelopment, but the greater the concern about
deadweight loss. Alternatively, the auction structure could be the reverse, with a fixed relatively
low level of patent damages for the patent term extension, and bidders offering cash or
investment commitments. The Ayres and Klemperer argument provides a general reason for a
lower level of patent damages and limits on injunctive relief, but the price level need not be
determined through an auction mechanism.
b. Repeated Extensions

Regardless of the auction currency, the process might be repeated iteratively. As the end
of the patent extension period approaches, the patentee will consider whether to demand another
auction and thus seek another extension.154 The patentee should have roughly appropriate
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Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse
Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1028-31 (1999).
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Conceivably, a third party that wins an auction also could seek another patent extension. The victory by a third party,
however, ordinarily would signal that the benefits of continuity of ownership were not as high as the patentee thought.
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incentives in determining when to request patent extension auctions and how long of a patent
extension to request. Each time, the patentee will have an incentive to wait long enough to ensure
that additional development will be needed, but to seek an extension early enough to ensure that
it will be able to recoup its development expenses. Similarly, the patentee will want a relatively
short patent term so that it does not end up paying a premium for a portion of a patent term in
which it has no advantage over the victorious third party. But it will want a relatively long patent
term to ensure that it will own the patent long enough to be able to recoup expenses. This does
not prove that the patentee’s privately optimal decision will be socially optimal, but the balance
of considerations likely places the patentee in a better position than the government to determine
when patent extension auctions should occur and the length of term extensions.
c. Copyright Term Extensions

The result of this system would be a regime of indefinitely renewable patents,155
analogous to the regime of indefinitely renewable copyrights suggested by Landes and Posner.156
The differences are that in the patent extension auction system, the price of renewal would vary
with the value of the intellectual property right and that the intellectual property right holder will
generally have an incentive to seek renewal only where renewal is likely to be socially
beneficial. Auctioning copyright term extensions through any means would accomplish the first
of these two goals in the copyright context, but not the second. Copyright extension auctions
through a method analogous to the patent extension auctions described here might attempt to
accomplish the second goal. In copyright, however, nondevelopment is not likely to be a great
concern, because the owner of a copyright can obtain a new copyright on a derivative of the
original work.157 Moreover, the copyright term, even before the Copyright Term Extension Act,
is sufficiently long that a copyright holder will probably not spend much on marketing the
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Mark Lemley anticipates that an implication of theories that intellectual property rights may ensure efficient management of
property is that “there seems little reason to terminate that right after a period of years.” Lemley, supra note 47, at 131. Indeed,
my analysis suggests that a definite termination may not be optimal. Lemley might overstate the point, however, because those
who advance what he refers to as “ex post” justifications for intellectual property concede that intellectual property rights have
costs, including deadweight loss. The challenge, which I seek to meet here, is to find a way to extend patents just long enough to
allow for efficient management and development of the property rights, until the cost of further extensions would exceed the
benefit.
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Landes & Posner, supra note 132.
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original work, and there well be little need for commercial experiments to test the public’s
demand for the original.
In copyright, the danger is thus less likely to be underdevelopment than
overdevelopment, producing what Landes and Posner refer to as “congestion externalities.”158
For example, Landes and Posner justify the long copyright term through a worry that if Mickey
Mouse were in the public domain, different authors might use him in different ways, thus
blurring the character and reducing the total social value that the character produces.159 A slightly
different mechanism, in conjunction with a shorter initial copyright term, might provide an
efficient way of allowing long copyright terms only in cases in which such congestion
externalities are an issue. For example, the initial auction might be for three different licenses to
the copyrighted work. The copyright holder would then have an opportunity to keep the
copyright without giving away a license by paying an amount equal to some multiple of the
average of the top three bids. The copyright holder’s valuation is likely to be particularly high
relative to the bids for licenses when the competition among the licensees risks oversaturating
the public or causing inconsistent development of the copyrighted work in sequels.
IV. CONCLUSION

Although intellectual property commentators have long discussed the optimal length of
the patent term, they have assumed that the existing term is long enough to give patentees
sufficient incentive to commercialize their patented inventions. Two new developments, one
empirical and one theoretical, make such assumptions problematic. First, patents increasingly are
being granted on embryonic inventions, particularly in the field of genomics. Such inventions
may require study for a period longer than a patent term. Second, economic models of
intellectual property suggest that inventors may acquire patents at a relatively early stage of
development for their option value. By the time a patent option would be worth exercising if
most of the patent term remained, so little might remain that commercialization is not feasible.
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Landes & Posner, supra note 132, at 484-88; see also Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and
Related Doctrines, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that the derivative right is justified in part because it reduces the
number of derivative works that would be made).
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be blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a Casanova, others as catmeat, others as an animal-rights advocate, still others as
the henpecked husband of Minnie.”).
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The

patent

system

includes

some

mechanisms

that

significantly

limit

the

underdevelopment problem. First, by imposing substantial requirements for patenting, the patent
system reduces the proportion of expenses that would need to be made after patenting. The
patent underdevelopment concern thus provides a counterweight to the prospect theory of
patents, which argues that patents should be granted early. Second, improvement patents can in
effect extend the patent term. Improvement patents, however, may not be available for some
types of development activity, including scientific experimentation, commercial testing,
marketing, and research producing subpatentable inventions. As a result, patent extensions,
though probably welfare-decreasing for the vast majority of inventions, might enhance social
welfare for a small subset.
Auctions for the right to patent term extensions provide a possible solution to the
problem. Under this approach, a patentee would be able to call for such an extension before the
end of the patent term. The patentee, however, would need to offer a winning bid substantially in
excess of that of the runner-ups to win the extension, and a patentee who calls for but does not
win an auction would pay a fine. This approach will tend to result in patent extensions only in
cases in which the value of continuity of patent ownership is relatively high. These will be the
cases in which the patentee would like to make investments in the remainder of the original
patent term that would pay off primarily in the extension period and thus in which the degree of
patent underdevelopment otherwise would be high.
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